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Acronyms and Clarifications. 
 
DOP - Declaration of Principles 
JMCC – Jerusalem Media and Communication Center 
PLO - Palestine Liberation Organization 
PNA - Palestinian National Authority  
PNC - Palestinian National Council  
UNLU - United National Leadership of the Uprising 
 
Some of the articles found on the internet do not have page numbers. If they were 
divided into numbered chapters I used these as references in the text. Four articles 
did not have numbered chapters either and in these cases I put the name of the 
chapter in which the text I was referring to could be found, in footnotes.  
Due to the very frequent use of the Hamas Charter and the Declaration of 
Principles throughout the entire thesis I will, apart from the first time mentioned, 
refer to these sources without the year in which they were published. 
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Hamas’s Resistance to the Oslo Agreement. 
1. Introduction. 
On September 13, 1993 the Declaration of Principles (DOP), otherwise known as 
the Oslo agreement, was signed by Israel and representatives from the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO). The agreement represented a breakthrough in the 
stalled peace process of the difficult Israel-Palestinian conflict, and was both 
enthusiastically supported and heavily criticized. This thesis deals with the 
opposition to the agreement, seen from the perspective of one actor; Hamas, the 
Islamic Resistance Movement, which was one of the movements most firmly 
opposed to the agreement. I chose to focus upon Hamas because since the time of 
its creation is has grown to become a very important actor in the Israel-Palestinian 
conflict. During its time of existence it has taken large steps into the Palestinian 
political arena, which for a long time was dominated by the PLO’s struggle against 
Israel. It has demonstrated itself as a strong and potent force that possesses the 
ability to destroy possible peace arrangements if it is in the movement’s interests. 
It has representatives abroad and supporters in both Arab countries and in other 
countries with Muslim communities. 
 
1.1. Research Question.  
What were the main reasons for Hamas’s opposition to the Oslo agreement? This 
is what this thesis strives to find out. In the extensive literature on the subject three 
factors that can explain the movement’s resistance stand out. These are political, 
religious and what I have chosen to call tactical reasons of opposition. In 
identifying Hamas’s reasons to oppose the Oslo agreement one must look at all 
these factors because the issue is very complex and the research question 
necessitates a multifaceted answer. The thesis will seek to answer which one of 
these factors that constituted the most important reason to resist.  
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In identifying the reasons of opposition I interpret the Hamas Charter from 
1988, as some of the reasons can be found in this document, and I interpret actions 
and statements from the time immediately following the signing as well as from 
the period in which the agreement was implemented.  This way I will be able to 
discuss the various reasons behind Hamas’s rejection of Oslo in light of the whole 
period from the creation of Hamas in 1988 until the end of the Oslo process in the 
late 1990s. In order to provide a fuller picture of the situation and to discuss the 
movement’s reactions to the agreement it is also necessary to look at some 
developments of the Israel-Palestinian situation in a longer historical perspective, 
as well as Hamas’s relations to other Palestinian groups and to Israel. I believe it is 
crucial to be aware of what the Palestinian reality was like in the years before the 
agreement was made, because the developments and events that occurred these 
years set the stage for Oslo and what happened in this period constitutes an 
important part in explaining the resistance. After 1993 I pay close attention to 
Hamas’s relationship and interaction with other Palestinian groups and I discuss 
the movement’s different approaches in dealing with these and with the 
agreement. My time span ends with the signing of the Wye accord in October 
1998. By this time many Hamas leaders had been assassinated and the accord 
ended all hope of establishing good relations with the Palestinian National 
Authority (PNA) (Kristianasen, 1999:32). In 1999 Oslo’s official time table ended 
(Waage 2004:168) and with the second Palestinian intifada that erupted in 2000 
the agreement was definitely dead.     
In seeking an answer to the research question I have made an effort to 
include different elements such as politics, religious beliefs, economy and 
survival. This is something I often find missing in the extensive literature on the 
subject. Many people have written about the Oslo agreement and the opposition to 
it1. However, in my experience there is a tendency to focus upon very few factors 
at a time, and the result then, in my view, only explains part of the reasons behind 
                                                 
1 See Mishal and Sela (2000), Hroub (2002), Abu-Amr (1993), Nüsse (1998), Milton-Edwards (1996).  
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the opposition. My thesis strives to provide a complex explanation of Hamas’s 
resistance rather than a single factor explanation.  
 
1.2. Presentation of the Chapters. 
In the following of this chapter, I will present my methodological approach and 
my sources. In relation to this I will discuss some possible risks or weaknesses. I 
will then proceed to give an account for some of the terms I use.  
In Chapter 2 I will discuss some elements that are important in order to 
understand the general situation of the Palestinian society at the time when the 
DOP came. I will do this by demonstrating how various factors, such as the 
relationship between Palestinian political groups, internal politics and external 
factors, influenced the Palestinian political and societal environment.  
The Oslo agreement itself and the immediate reactions to it will be the 
focus of Chapter 3. By reactions I refer to statements and actions of support and 
protests. Although in the thesis, I will to some extent talk about the visible 
reactions or consequences of the reactions, such as increased terrorism, suicide 
actions, abductions etc, my main focus will be on the underlying reasons behind 
the opposition to the DOP. This will be discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, the main 
discussion chapters. I will focus upon political reasons behind the opposition, as 
well as tactical and religious reasons of resistance. While reading, it is important 
to have in mind that these factors cannot be regarded or understood isolated or 
independently of one another. They are interconnected to large extents in fact the 
tactical reason is a political one. I chose to differentiate between them, because 
they each highlight different aspects of the agreement and of Hamas’s beliefs and 
ideas. In Chapter 4 I discuss socio-political reasons of opposition as well as 
economic-political issues. These political reasons to object to the agreement deal 
with the possibility of achieving a free Palestine, while the tactical-political 
reasons of Chapter 5 deal with the means to achieve the objective and Hamas as a 
movement. In this chapter I will discuss why the agreement was seen as a threat to 
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the very existence of Hamas. This part concerns, among other things, the practical 
and ideological considerations that emerged with the DOP and the tactical steps 
and decision Hamas had to make in order to survive when the agreement was a 
fact. That is why I chose to employ the term “tactical” reasons of opposition.  
In the following chapter the religious argumentation of Hamas is the focus 
and Chapter 7 is the concluding chapter. I will here on the basis of the discussion 
chapters do an assessment of what reasons; the political, the tactical or the 
religious that were most important to explain Hamas’s opposition to Oslo.  
 
1.3. Method. 
To provide an answer I will discuss in which ways the agreement 
contradicted the beliefs and ideology of Hamas. As seen from the presentation of 
the chapters above the investigation is structured according to the three factors. I 
will discuss how the agreement affected Hamas’s objective of achieving an 
Islamic state, how it affected the chance of achieving a free Palestine and how it 
influenced the strategy of reaching these objectives. This corresponds respectively 
with Chapter 6, religious opposition, Chapter 4, political opposition and Chapter 5, 
tactical opposition. 
The focus of the thesis is analyses of declarations, statements and actions. 
The empirical sources needed for discussion are gathered both from primary and 
secondary sources. To discuss Hamas’s reasons of opposition to the Oslo 
agreement I have chosen to interpret documents from the Oslo process, documents 
about Hamas’s beliefs and opinions as well as analyses of secondary literature on 
the subject. I will, among other things, identify the reasons by comparing the 
Hamas documents and the statements of Hamas’s activists with the stipulations of 
the agreement and in some cases the lack of such stipulations. To highlight why 
issues were important to the movement I will also use analyses and opinions from 
Palestinian intellectuals and politicians not affiliated with Hamas. The opposition 
was broad and Hamas shared many of its concerns with other opponents. By 
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interpreting the different sources in light of each other I hope to find various 
reasons of opposition. 
Because of the breadth of my research question I saw this as the best way 
of retrieving relevant information. An alternative way of doing it could have been 
doing field research. I did not do that however, because it is very time consuming 
and because I believe a field study would have provided me with a narrower kind 
of information than what I needed. I wanted macro-level information, information 
that could provide me with the big picture of the situation, and I believe a field 
study would have given me information on a micro-level. In addition, I discuss 
statements from Hamas leaders and to some degree I lean on official statements. I 
regard using written sources to obtain these statements as more efficient in my 
case than trying to retrieve the information on my own, as it is difficult to get 
access to the right people.  
 
1.4. Primary and Secondary Sources, Risks and Weaknesses.  
My main primary sources are the Hamas Charter and the Declaration of Principles. 
The former is the constitution and the canonical text of Hamas in which the 
movements in 36 different articles depicts its ambitions, its goals, its ideology, its 
relationship to other organizations, its view upon the Israel-Palestinian conflict 
and more generally its understanding of society and people. It was issued on 
August 18, 1988. A majority of the articles contain a passage from the Quran or 
from other Islamic texts or a quote from Muslim scholars. By analyzing it one can 
find some reasons why Hamas objected to the Oslo agreement. Especially the 
religiously motivated resistance, but also the politically motivated one is visible 
here. By interpreting and discussing the Charter I will demonstrate how Hamas’s 
beliefs and ideology opposes not only the decisions reached in the DOP, but also 
the making and signing of the agreement itself. The religious beliefs of Hamas are 
primarily expressed in the Charter, and by interpreting it one can identify and 
explain the religious reactions and arguments of the group. That is why this 
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document is used to a larger extent in Chapter 6, which concerns the religious 
reasons of opposition, than in the previous chapters. I will discuss its articles in 
connection with nationalism, political rights and issues of religious importance. I 
will also touch upon whether the religious objections are used to promote a 
political point of view or it they really are a product of religious beliefs. 
The Declaration of Principles (1993), my other main primary source, 
consists of 17 short articles as well as four appendixes and some complimentary 
agreed minutes. Among other things it puts forward plans for Palestinian elections, 
for the transfer of responsibilities to appointed or elected Palestinian authorities, 
for Israeli military withdrawal, and for several cooperation projects and various 
regional programs.  
I will also use the letters of recognition exchanged between PLO Chairman 
Yasser Arafat and Israel’s Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of the Labor Party in the 
immediate aftermath of the signing, because although not part of the DOP they 
constitute important supplementary documents. Some other primary sources are 
three Hamas leaflets, the Charter and the Constitution of the PLO (1968) and the 
Constitution of Fatah (1964), the Palestinian Declaration of Independence (1988) 
and five UN resolutions. 
In Chapter 4, in order to discuss the political reasons of opposition I will to 
larger extents than in the following chapters go into the agreement itself and 
analyze specific articles. When I rely more on the DOP itself here than later, this is 
due to the fact that the agreement is written primarily in political and economical 
terms and Hamas’s political arguments are often a response to the concrete issues 
discussed or in some cases a response to issues that have been excluded or nearly 
so from the agreement.  
When it comes to the primary sources there are matters concerning possible 
weaknesses or risks one need to have in mind. From reading the Charter it is easy 
to get the impression that all the movement’s actions stem from and can be 
legitimized in religion. This is in fact what the Charter says, but is it necessarily 
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so? I find this to be somewhat misleading; I believe it is important to have in mind 
that it was written and published during an uprising in the middle of a very 
political conflict. It also identifies its enemy and states political objectives. In 
addition, it was published at the same time as the PLO expressed will to 
participate in a peace conference based on an acceptance of Israel, something to 
which Hamas strongly objects. Thus, one might as well regard it as a political 
document. A weakness of using the Hamas Charter as a primary source is that 
there are many issues it does not address. The DOP is very specific and in many 
cases it is difficult to use the Charter as a basis for discussion of specific, concrete 
issues. In these cases I had to resort to additional sources.     
From the signing of the DOP until now there has been much written about 
the agreement and on the debate about it, including on Hamas’s opposition to it. 
Among my many theorists are Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela (2000), Andrea 
Nüsse (1998), Hisham Ahmad (1994) and Khaled Hroub (2002) my main 
secondary sources. They analyze and discuss different aspects of Hamas of and 
Palestinian groups, society and politics. These authors all represent different 
perspectives and because they do not focus upon the same matters they contribute 
in providing me with the depth I need to answer the research question. Secondary 
literature is my main source in Chapter 5 which deals with the tactical reasons of 
opposition. Here I use Mishal and Sela as my starting point. They believe that the 
DOP threatened to put an end to the uprising and to the armed struggle and this 
way removed Hamas’s reason to exist. I will discuss this theory by seeing it in the 
light of the opinions of other authors, such as Ahmad and Nüsse, as well as in light 
of the Hamas Charter and the movement’s will and ability to adjust to the actual 
political situation and to undertake pragmatic measures. 
There are also some dangers associated with the use of secondary sources. 
Using theories by others and investing it with one’s own interpretation can be 
problematic because there is always a chance of having misinterpreted the other 
person’s theory or opinion. Besides, one should not forget that secondary literature 
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is also interpretations of events, opinions and statements. Thus using it will in 
many cases mean an interpretation of an interpretation. In order to evaluate the 
probability of an interpretation’s correctness one may compare it to other 
interpretations. If various independent sources make similar assessments and 
interpretations there is a greater chance of the source being correct. One can also 
see secondary sources in light of primary sources and this way do an evaluation of 
the formers’ accuracy. This way one may reduce these risks.  One must also bear 
in mind that there are chances that the secondary literature is wrong or imprecise, 
for instance in the case of quotations. If possible one should avoid literature in 
which the use of references is unclear, defective or missing. 
One should also remember that a text is a product of the context in which it 
was written. Most of my sources were written and published after 1993 up until 
2004. Right after the signing the debate on the agreement was strong and emotions 
were high. There was optimism as well as pessimism about the future of the 
Israelis and Palestinians and there was great uncertainty about how the agreement 
would impact the people, the many organizations, society and life in general. The 
author of a text written in the recent years has more information about the debate 
around the agreement, its consequences, the groups involved and the situation in 
general than the authors of the texts written in the immediate aftermath of the 
signing. He or she may do assessments on the events that have actually taken 
place, while the authors of older texts to a larger degree had to make their analyses 
upon what could happen. Thus, the time of writing influences the discussion and 
the authors’ analyses.   
Another concern is that while writing about an issue as controversial and 
intense as this conflict and the actors involved in it, there is always a risk of using 
biased sources, as many writers on the field have a personal opinion about it, and 
whether it is intentional or not, they may incorporate a political agenda into the 
writing. In a situation of such complexity it is difficult to be completely free of 
prejudices and biases and it is impossible to avoid biased literature. By bearing 
 14
this in mind while doing research and writing I believe I have managed to reduce 
this risk. To counter this possible problem one can use a variety of authors and 
experts. I chose to use theorists from Israel, the Arab countries as well as from 
other parts of the world. They are well known and considered experts on their field 
and some have long careers in writing about and lecturing on Middle Eastern 
issues. In some cases the authors clearly identified with one camp, but I did not 
regard this as a problem as the authors’ opinions in these cases expressed or were 
used to illustrate or describe the opposition to the agreement or to the other part.  
Another secondary source is opinion polls which I have chosen to employ 
on a couple of occasions. For illustration purposes I use excerpts from two 
different ones, undertaken in September 1993 and January 1994 from the 
Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC) which was the first 
institution in the Arab World to conduct public opinion surveys on a regular and 
methodological basis. Both were conducted by face-to-face interviews with people 
visiting the general service offices in the main towns. The former had a random 
sample of 1505 Palestinian participants while in the latter the number was 1622. In 
both the margin of error is sat to plus or minus three percent with a confidence 
level of 95 percent. Both of them specifies the sample distribution in terms of 
gender, occupation, average age, geographical roots and the 1993 survey also 
states civilian status. 
The fact that the interviews were conducted on a face-to-face basis may 
have a negative consequence in that the respondents could have felt it was hard to 
answer in a completely honest way. One may wonder whether anonymous polls 
would have produced the same results. Another weakness is that the sample 
cannot be said to be entirely random. After all, it consists of people who all visited 
the general service offices. However, since the surveys are used to illustrate 
matters further specified or discussed elsewhere I choose to trust that the findings 
underpin general tendencies. As such I believe the results to be valid for more than 
just the respondents.  
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An additional weakness is the fact that I do not speak nor read Arabic. This 
means that when I use sources originally in Arabic, especially those found on the 
internet, such as the Charter and the Constitutions of Fatah and the PLO, I have to 
rely on that the translations are accurate and correct. In order to make sure of this I 
made it a rule to check several translations of the same texts and then if they were 
identical or nearly so I took this as proof of their correctness. I did not experience 
this as much of a challenge, because I always had access to several translations. 
Another matter in this concern is that a source can be correctly translated, but 
nevertheless be if not wrong, then at least imprecise and misleading. This is 
because words may have a cultural meaning to them in addition to the strict lexical 
and semantic one. This cultural reference may be lost in translation. This is also 
true when it comes to interpreting. Because my cultural background and frame of 
reference is different from the one of my theorists and authors there might be 
matters I overlook.   
Finally, while interpreting and discussing it can be very difficult to see the 
relationship between Hamas’s explicit arguments against the agreement and the 
underlying reasons to the opposition, as these are not always the same. An 
objection may be formulated in a religious language while the core of the issue 
may be political. Also, as will be evident, Hamas’s ideology as expressed in the 
Charter is not always in line with the members’ statements or with the 
movement’s actions. When the movement makes statements or undertakes actions 
that may breach with the Charter, this is often reflecting a necessity of adapting to 
a current political situation. In these cases the activists demonstrate a clever will 
and ability to be pragmatic, for instance by resorting to additional Islamic sources 
to give their actions religious legitimacy.   
In all methodological approaches and use of sources there will be risks or 
weaknesses, but these can be reduced if the researcher is conscious of them. Thus, 
in spite of the weaknesses and dangers related to using theories by others and 
interpreting material, I believe this to be a fruitful way to answer the research 
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question. After all both the primary and secondary sources provide useful 
information as well as facts about Hamas’s opposition to the Oslo agreement. It is 
evident that in the case of such a research question as my own there cannot be just 
one correct answer and that is not the objective either.  
 
1.5. Terms and Limitations. 
In the thesis I will use some Arabic words. These are mainly words that are 
commonly used both in Western media and literature. I do, however, sometimes 
for the sake of variation employ the equivalent English terms, but I see no need to 
further explain this here as it will be evident from the context. I will use the 
“Declaration of Principles”, “the Oslo agreement” or “accords” or just the 
“agreement” as synonymous terms. When referring to Hamas and the PLO I will 
also employ the terms “organization”, “groups” and “movements” synonymously. 
Other synonyms are “intifada” and “uprising”. 
When I refer to Hamas I refer to the leading representatives of the 
movement, unless else is specified. I primarily discuss concerns that were shared 
by a majority of the members and adherents and by both the civilian, political and 
military wing of the movement. However, it is important to have in mind that the 
people who are associated with Hamas do not constitute a homogeneous group; 
they are both women and men with different social and occupational backgrounds. 
In other words they are diverse and differences of opinions do exist. One common 
feature is that they are all Islamist. “[Islamists are] individuals who believe in the 
necessity of establishing a society based on Islamic principles (…)” (Elias, 
1999:86). They wish to strengthen the role of Islam in politics and society, usually 
with the objective of establishing an Islamic state; i.e., a state based on Sharia, 
Islamic law. When I use the term “Islamist” in the Palestinian context I usually 
refer to members of Hamas or Islamic Jihad. There are both radical and moderate 
Islamists. What differentiates them is that the moderate do not pursue the 
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establishment of an Islamic state by violent means. Hamas is most often referred 
to as a radical Islamist group.  
As the thesis deals with the resistance to Oslo it is evident that the focus 
must be on the criticism of the agreement rather than on the positive aspects such 
as the actual achievements. That is not to say that there were no positive aspects. 
Apart from some brief concluding remarks it is beside the thesis’ thematic 
scope to make recommendations for how one should conduct peace processes and 
make peace agreements, but this essay highlights some of the problematic aspects 
of the agreement to which Hamas had to relate and the investigation thus also 
sheds some light on some of the difficulties in finding a solution to the conflict. 
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2. Background. 
In this chapter I will look into some elements that impacted Palestinian society and 
politics in the years preceding the signing of the Declaration of Principles.   
 
2.1. The Muslim Brotherhood. 
In 1928 the Muslim Brotherhood was created in Egypt by Hasan al-Banna, a 
school teacher influenced by classical Islamic learning and Sufism (Mitchell, 
1969:3). The movement was created as a response to the British presence in Egypt 
and what al-Banna perceived to be a moral decay in Egyptian society due to the 
absence of Islam. He believed that only with Islam as a guiding force in national 
life could Egypt prosper. Al-Banna wanted an Islamic order, based on a modern 
reinterpretation of Sharia, which could ensure social justice, economic well-being 
and political harmony (Cleveland, 1999:196). During the 1930s the Brotherhood 
established branches all over Egypt and a decade later it had more than half a 
million members and even more sympathizers. It was largely attractive especially 
to the poor and to university students. Part of the support was due to the 
movement’s focus on national independence and reforms of various kinds, such as 
land redistribution and social welfare programs which were designed to benefit the 
marginalized people of Egypt. The Brothers were also successful in establishing 
close relations with labor unions as well as merging with other Islamic movements 
(Mitchell, 1969:10), such as the Society of Islamic Culture, in Cairo, which 
granted them access to Islamic circles. “(…) the Brotherhood represented the 
stability of Islamic values and offered the hope that they could be incorporated 
into the uncertain future” (Cleveland, 1999:197). In 1936 the Muslim Brotherhood 
became involved in Palestine for the first time in order to fight against the British 
mandate powers and the plan for Jewish immigration to Palestine. In 1946 the 
Brotherhood’s first Palestinian office was opened in Jerusalem soon to be 
followed by other cities (Ahmad, 1994: chapter 1). Up until 1967 the movement 
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fought the Israeli occupation and it constituted a strong political force, especially 
in the Gaza Strip, whereas in the West Bank the Brothers’ work was mainly social 
and religious. However, in 1967 the movement had a change of tactic concerning 
resistance activities, also in Gaza. From this day on they were mainly preoccupied 
with the Islamization of society through Islamic teaching, preaching and 
education. To recruit members the Brothers used open mass mobilization. This 
gave them an advantage compared to the nationalist resistance groups which relied 
on underground activities. In contrast to the PLO, which saw the liberation of 
Palestine as their primary objective, the Muslim Brotherhood’s main goal was the 
establishment of an Islamic state, and the liberation of Palestine came in second to 
this Islamization. The idea was that when the time was ripe Palestine would be 
liberated with the support from the entire Islamic world (Hroub, 2002:26). 
A disadvantage for the Muslim Brothers was, according to Abu-Amr 
(1993:7), that the “Islamic restructuring of society and religious education seemed 
to have little relevance for a population that was seeking liberation from a foreign 
occupation”. By choosing to hold a very low profile in politics the movement lost 
potential adherents. This changed somewhat in the late 1970s when the Palestinian 
resistance movements had lost some of their appeal due to lack of achievements. 
Encouraged also by the Islamic ideas spread with the Iranian revolution, the 
Brothers stepped up their political activities, but they did still not engage in armed 
resistance. 
 
2.1.1. The Intifada and the Establishment of Hamas. 
In December 1987 the first Palestinian intifada erupted as a spontaneous 
Palestinian mass rebellion and response against everyday Israeli oppressions and 
control. As mentioned the word means uprising and it brought people of all ages 
out in the streets and involved all sectors of society. The intifada’s main goal was 
to end the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and establish an 
independent Palestinian state. In the short term the Palestinians participated in 
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strikes and refused to work in Israel (Mishal; Sela, 2000:55) and also boycotted 
Israeli goods. The aim was to disengage as much as possible from the structure of 
the occupation (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, 2001:29). The intifada provided 
the Muslim Brothers with a chance of gaining influence by spreading their 
message of Islamization and religious devotion to a broader audience. In the new 
situation it would have been impossible for them to have continued their line of 
mainly apolitical work. They could no longer risk being on the side line. On the 
other hand, by joining the uprising the movement faced a risk of having to 
sacrifice itself in case of the intifada being repressed by the Israeli authority, and 
also risk sacrificing good relations with the Israeli authority. The solution was 
provided by Ahmad Yassin, a preacher who in 1973 founded al-Mujamma al-
Islami, the Islamic Center (Abu-Amr, 1993:7). “(…) [A] way out of [the dilemma 
was] to create an ostensible separate organization out of the Muslim Brotherhood 
to take responsibility for its participation in the intifada” (ibid, 11). This new 
organization was Hamas, the word meaning enthusiasm or ardor in Arabic and an 
acronym for Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya, the Islamic Resistance 
Movement. It was established in late February 1988 (Milton- Edwards, 1996:146). 
This way the Muslim Brotherhood could avoid jeopardizing its future by 
disclaiming Hamas if the intifada failed. In case of it succeeding the Brothers 
could take credit for Hamas’s actions by recognizing the group as part of their own 
movement. According to Abu-Amr (1993:11,12), as the intifada evolved, the 
Muslim Brothers began to equate themselves with Hamas as Hamas seemed to be 
successful in the intifada, and provided the Brothers with a way of escaping the 
criticism launched at them earlier for not having participated in the armed 
resistance. “Hamas had soon become a credible and convenient name for the 
rehabilitated Muslim Brotherhood Society (…)” (ibid, 12). Article 2 of the Hamas 
Charter thus reads that “[t]he Islamic Resistance Movement [otherwise known as 
Hamas], is one of the wings of the Muslim Brothers in Palestine”.  
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2.2. Nationalism. 
After 1948 the Palestinians became a deprived minority, as second class citizens 
either in Israel or in neighboring countries. This promoted the development of a 
particular Palestinian identity as opposed to Arab. Some decades later, more 
exactly by 1969 when Fatah, or the Palestine National Liberation Movement, had 
taken control of the PLO with support from Egypt, this had become a natural 
political frame of reference (Litvak, 1996)2. This was also true for the younger 
generations of Islamists, those born under Israeli occupation. Identifying oneself in 
national terms became just as natural as claiming adherence to a religious identity. 
This way there was an assimilation of nationalism and religion through an 
integration of a Palestinian identity and an Islamic one. Although, at the time, the 
Muslims Brothers were preoccupied with their religious and social work, they 
were by no means untouched by this nascent Palestinian nationalism. 
With the establishment of Hamas the question of liberating Palestine 
received more attention than it had earlier with the Muslim Brotherhood. Although 
the Islamization of society was still considered very important, the efforts to 
retrieve homeland was seen as more important (Mishal; Sela, 1997)3. This is 
evident in the Hamas Charter in which nationalism is an element very much 
focused upon and very salient. Litvak (1996) 4 argues that in its efforts to become 
a serious alternative to the PLO, Hamas had to formulate a nationalism acceptable 
to the masses. The nationalism of Hamas was not the same as the secular 
nationalism advocated by the nationalist movements. According to al-Banna, 
secular nationalism would create divisions and bring animosity to society (al-
Banna in Wendell, 1978:50-52). To avoid compromising its own beliefs it was 
clear that Hamas’s nationalism had to be different. It had to be religious. Al-Banna 
believed religion underpins the love for one’s homeland and the willpower and 
force to strive for its liberation. In this way, nationalism, or patriotism as he called 
                                                 
2 See chapter named “The Muslim Brethren and Nationalism”. 
3 See chapter named “Islamism and Nationalism”. 
4 See chapter named “The Muslim Brethren and Nationalism”. 
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it, is seen as something good and Islamic. So building on these beliefs Hamas 
created a brand of nationalism that was highly Islamic. Article 12 of the Hamas 
Charter reads:  
(…) while other nationalisms consist of material, human and territorial 
considerations, the nationalism of Hamas also carries, in addition to all those, the 
all divine factors which lend to it its spirit and life; so much so that it connects 
with the origin of the spirit and the source of life and raises in the skies of the 
Homeland the Banner of the Lord, thus inexorably connecting earth with heaven.  
 
According to Litvak (1996)5 what was undertaken was an Islamization of the idea 
of Palestine. This is evident in many ways, foremost by linking nationalism and 
religion to such a degree that they become inseparable. Article 12 of the Charter 
reads “Hamas regards Nationalism (Wataniyya) as part and parcel of the religious 
faith. Nothing is loftier or deeper in Nationalism than waging Jihad against the 
enemy and confronting him when he sets foot on the land of the Muslims”. This 
explicitly links nationalism and religion. 
 
2.3. The Relationship with the PLO. 
The fact that Hamas adopted nationalism to such a degree, also gave the activists a 
further advantage. It enabled them to a greater extent than before, to compete with 
the PLO. Hamas’s relationship with the PLO and the political performance of the 
latter can also help explain, as we will see, the rising popularity of Hamas. From 
reading the Hamas Charter one may get the impression that the relationship 
between Hamas and the PLO is nothing but cordial and amicable, as the Charter 
states that the PLO “(…) constitutes a father, a brother, a relative, a friend” (article 
27). The relationship, however, is a not that uncomplicated, as the two movements 
both compete over adherents and have similar national agendas, although different 
foci- a religious one and a Pan-Arabic, secular one. Hamas believes the PLO is 
ideologically confused as the Arab world and hence the PLO’s members have 
been subjected to an ideological invasion. Hamas criticizes the PLO for having a 
                                                 
5 See chapter named “The Muslim Brethren and Nationalism”. 
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secular agenda and article 27 of the Hamas Charter reads that secularism is 
contradictory to religion, and although the movement appreciates the role of the 
PLO in the Arab-Israeli conflict “(…) [Hamas is] unable to exchange the present 
or future Islamic Palestine with the secular idea”. Concerning Hamas’s recognition 
of the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people there are clearly 
some reservations made. One might call it a conditional recognition. One 
condition is found in article 27 in which Hamas states that not until the PLO 
adopts Islam as a way of life will Hamas “(…) become its [the PLO’s] soldiers”. 
The recognition is also conditional upon the PLO not ending its struggle for the 
liberation of Palestine and on the non-recognition of Israel (Hroub, 2002:297). 
This way Hamas does not exclude possibilities of closer future relations and 
cooperation with the PLO. It has been careful not to distance itself permanently 
from the PLO while at the same time keeping some distance in case of the 
relationship being unfavorable to Hamas. Thus Hamas’s position towards the PLO 
can be said to be somewhat ambiguous and unclear. 
The relationship can also be characterized as very turbulent. The first 
official, although indirect, recognition of Hamas by the PLO came in April 1990 
when Hamas was invited to join a committee working on reconstituting the 
Palestinian National Council (PNC) (ibid, 92). The PNC is the Palestinian 
Parliament in exile and the governing body of the PLO (Robinson, 1997:163). 
Hamas declined the invitation and was subsequently accused of both creating 
divisions in the nationalist ranks as well as having been established with the 
support of Israel. This accusation seems to be repeated at times when the tension 
between the two groups is high (Hroub, 2002:92.). A little later Hamas was 
recognized by the PLO as an important actor in the national struggle. The 
relationship worsened with the peace negotiations undertaken in Madrid in 
October 1991 which later continued in Washington until 1993. Although not much 
of importance was achieved at the Madrid Conference it should be noted that this 
was the first time that representatives from Israel, the Palestinian community and 
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other Arab states met to discuss peace (Cleveland, 1999:484). Two diplomacy 
tracks were established; one Israeli-Arab track and one Israeli-Palestinian track. 
Hamas strongly opposed the meeting and condemned it as the “the conference for 
selling the territory” (Nüsse, 1998:127) and the movement claimed the PLO 
delegation lacked legitimacy. From 1991 to 1993 Hamas’s reservations towards 
the PLO grew stronger (Kurz; Tal, 1997: chapter 2) and the relationship was 
characterized by several attempts from the PLO to co-opt Hamas, for instance by 
claiming that the group was part of the PLO.  
 
2.4. Acceptance of UN Resolutions and Shift in Politics. 
In mid-November 1988 the PNC held a meeting in Algiers. The body was created 
in 1964, the same year as the PLO, and has members from all the different factions 
of the PLO as well as independent members. Its main assignments are making 
policy decisions and electing leaders (MidEastWeb, n.d). In Algiers the PNC and 
thus the PLO accepted the UN resolution 181 of 1947 which concerns the future of 
Palestine, as well as Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Resolution 242 of 
1967 emphasizes the need of sovereignty, territorial integrity, political 
independence and peace for every State in the area (article 1ii), while resolution 
338 of 1973 calls for an implementation of resolution 242 and a cease of all 
fighting and military activity (UN, 1947; 1967; 1973). Part III of the General 
Assembly resolution 181 sets forth independent Arab and Jewish states in the area 
known as Palestine prior to 1948 (Mishal; Sela, 2000:54). 
In addition to accepting these resolutions the PLO on November 15 also 
published a Palestinian Declaration of Independence, in which it establishes the 
State of Palestine with Jerusalem as its capital and declares it will resolve 
international and regional problems by peaceful means and “(…) [reject] the threat 
of use of force, violence and intimidation against its [the Palestinian State’s] 
territorial integrity and political independence or those of any other State” (UN, 
1988). Implicit in the words “any other State” also lays the recognition of Israel 
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and a commitment by the PLO of refraining from violence against it. These were 
new words coming from the PLO, and not only were they new but also 
contradictory to the stance taken by the organization earlier. Article 9 of the PLO 
Charter of July 1968, adopted at the same time by the PNC, states that “[a]rmed 
struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine”. It also states that “Palestine, with 
the boundaries it had during the British Mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit” 
(article 2). The partition of Palestine and the establishment of Israel are seen as 
“(…) entirely illegal, regardless of the passage of time (…)” (article 19). The 
armed struggle is also accentuated in the 1968 Constitution of the PLO in which 
article 3 says that it shall be continued and escalated until victory is achieved.  
The ideas are shared by Fatah. Fatah means victory and it is a revolutionary 
movement (Fatah Constitution, 1964: principle 1). It was founded in 1958, partly 
by former members of the Muslim Brotherhood (Hroub, 2002:26, 88) as well as 
by others such as Arafat. In the late 1960s it joined the PLO and soon became the 
strongest faction within it (ibid, 96). One of the stated goals of the movement is 
the complete liberation, by armed struggle, of all Palestinian land, and the 
eradication of Israel (Fatah Constitution, 1964: article 12, 17, 19). In the 
Constitution Fatah also rejects all UN resolutions and projects undermining, in 
Fatah’s opinion, the Palestinians’ right in their homeland (ibid, article 6).  
The Declaration of Independence and the acceptance of the UN resolutions 
meant an abandonment of these articles, and the PNC meeting represented a major 
change in Palestinian politics, especially a political shift for the organizations in 
favor of the resolutions, which in addition to the PLO and Fatah were the 
Palestinian Communist Party and one of the factions within the Democratic Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine (Robinson, 1997:164). By recognizing Israel’s right 
to exist, these movements not only refrained from their strategy of armed struggle, 
but they also gave up one of their main goals,- namely the liberation of all 
Palestinian land, as the acceptance of a two-state solution meant giving up three 
quarters of Palestine (´Abd al-Shafi in Elmusa, 1993:17). Groups which rejected 
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the partition were Islamist movements, the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine and another faction of the Democratic Front (Robinson, 1997:164).  
According to Robinson (ibid.) the differences between the many factions on 
the Palestinian political arena became more pronounced after the meeting, but in 
addition to causing factionism on the political arena one also sees that the 
acceptance of the UN resolutions had consequences on an ideological basis. Ever 
since the creation of the national resistance movements, the ideas expressed in the 
articles mentioned above, had been the main goals and strategies of the 
movements. The PLO had since its establishment in 1964 dominated the fight 
against Israel, but now it was subject to heavy criticism from Hamas among 
others. Hamas rejected the PLO’s claim of being the sole representative of the 
Palestinian people and accused the movement of having abandoned its nationalist 
platform. The abandoned ideas were deeply rooted in the population and leaving 
them behind created a sort of ideological void. However, whereas the PLO and 
Fatah were perceived as having compromised their own position, Hamas now had 
the chance to attract more supporters by sticking to its firm resistance toward 
Israel; as the nationalist groups left their former objective of liberating all 
Palestinian land behind, Hamas stuck to the idea with renewed eager. This way the 
acceptance by the national resistance groups of a two-state solution constituted an 
advantage for Hamas, in that it was now one of the groups most firmly opposed to 
Israel and it was able to fill the ideological void. Hamas emphasized its 
determination to continue the struggle until all Palestinian land was liberated 
(Mishal; Sela, 2000:84).  
 
2.5. The Charters and Constitutions of the PLO, Fatah and Hamas. 
Hamas did not, however, simply take over the old arguments used by the 
nationalist groups. The arguments were redressed to better suit the organization. 
An added, or at least more emphasized, element was the religious element in the 
argumentation of Hamas. When Fatah and the PLO were established Pan-Arabism 
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was a very influential ideology and their Charters bear testimony to this. Fatah 
argued for the liberation of Palestine from a national-revolutionary point of view; 
“Palestine is part of the Arab World (…)” (Fatah Constitution, 1964: article 1), 
and their slogan is: “Long live Palestine, a free Arab state”, and the PLO Charter 
is formulated in national, civil and legal terms (Mishal; Sela, 2000:45). Palestine is 
emphasized as an indivisible part of the Arab homeland and Palestinians are part 
of an Arab nation. Both organizations stress Arab unity and use a secular 
language. In addition the Fatah Constitution (1964: article 42b) and the PLO 
Charter (1968: article 33) are amendable by a two-thirds vote in favor of 
amendments. The Hamas Charter is based on religious principles and divine 
“truths” related through the Quran and other religious texts and is thus not open 
for change. By using a religious rhetoric and phrasing its arguments in religious-
nationalistic terms, the arguments appeared more authentic to Hamas, as well as 
being more consistent with the overall religious ideology of the movement. This is 
evident in many ways, foremost in the religious terms used. While the PLO and 
Fatah refer to struggle against Zionism, colonialism and international imperialism, 
Hamas phrases the struggle in religious terms, using the word jihad to fight their 
enemies, the Jews and Zionists, who are often described by rather unflattering, 
demonizing and racist adjectives. Being Jewish is equated with being false, infidel 
and hostile. The word “Muslim” to a large extent replaces “Arabs” and 
“Palestinians” and while Fatah’s and the PLO’s main objective, in addition to 
liberating Palestinian land, is to build an independent and united Arab society 
(Fatah Constitution, 1964: article 15; PLO Charter, 1968: article 12, 13), Hamas’s 
goal is to build an Islamic state (Hamas Charter, article 9). Another difference is 
that the Hamas Charter embraces all aspects of life, whereas the other two groups 
concentrate on politics and the national struggle. Furthermore the Charter is 
saturated with religious references to the Quran, to God and the Prophet, to the 
early days of Islam and several of the articles end with a passage from Hadith or a 
Surah. The use of this religious language is consistent with the way Hamas 
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perceives the conflict. The Palestinian problem is a religious problem (article 15). 
Hamas does not see it in secular terms and believes the conflict must be dealt with 
on a religious basis. At the same time it is also possible that there are pragmatic 
concerns underlying the religious rhetoric. Islamism is growing in large parts of 
the Muslim world and Hamas can employ a religious language to attract more 
supporters. The time was ripe to use a different language than the one associated 
with ideologies that was perceived to have failed, such as Arab nationalism and 
Pan-Arabism. According to Abu-Amr (1993:13) Hamas does not explicitly define 
itself as an alternative to the PLO, but by using this religious language and by 
having an abundance of references to Islam, it is clear that it nevertheless portraits 
itself as an alternative to the secular nationalist movements. This contributed to an 
increased visibility of religion in politics and society in general, something to 
which the nationalist movements, for their part, were not immune. This is evident 
in the nationalist movements’ increasing use of religious references during the 
years of the intifada. An illustration of this is for instance that in the 1992 
elections for the Nablus Chamber of Commerce, pro-PLO nationalist groups took 
the name “The National Muslim Trend” (ibid, 18).  
 
2.6. Israel, Hamas and the PLO. 
The relationship between Israel and Hamas was a contradictory one. In spite of the 
movement’s stated goal of fighting Israel the Israeli government extended 
legitimacy to Hamas rather quickly after its establishment (Milton-Edwards, 
1996:151). They turned an almost blind eye to the emphasis on the struggle and 
seemed determined to maintain their view of Hamas as an Islamic movement 
preoccupied with religious reform. With the formerly mentioned turbulent and 
ambiguous relationship between the PLO and Hamas in mind it is not hard to 
understand that Israel and Hamas saw a common enemy and threat in the PLO, 
even though the PLO did by no means constitute the same threat to both. After all 
Hamas and the PLO somehow had a shared final goal; the liberation of Palestine 
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and respectively an Islamic and a secular state, but they differed in how to get 
there. Israel and the PLO had opposite objectives. The Israeli authorities extended 
legitimacy to Hamas and because they regarded Hamas as a competitor to the 
PLO, they hoped Hamas would gain support on the expense of the PLO and the 
secular nationalist movements. During the second year of the intifada, several 
meetings were held between Israeli and Hamas representatives. It was not until 
June 1989 that Hamas was declared a terrorist organization by the Israeli 
authorities and the Israeli control of the movement grew tighter. It is reasonable to 
believe that Israel’s “relaxed” attitude towards Hamas contributed to the frequent 
accusations from the PLO that Hamas was founded with Israeli support. 
In the years leading up to the signing of the Oslo agreement Hamas 
continued to challenge the PLO. In 1991, at a PNC meeting, Hamas apparently 
showed some will to join the PLO, but it can be argued that this was just a play to 
the gallery because Hamas attached conditions. They wanted 40 percent of the 
PNC’s seats and an annulment of the PLO’s acceptance of the UN resolutions 
discussed earlier. These conditions were, of course, unacceptable to the PLO 
(Kristianasen, 1999:20).  
Even though Hamas’s popularity increased with the nationalist movements’ 
abandonment of some of their main ideas, it should be noted that these 
movements, during the years of the intifada, still enjoyed great popular support. 
After all, the PLO had acquired legitimacy through more than 25 years of 
resistance to Israel. The organization did not lose this legitimacy completely, but it 
was questioned.   
Hamas enjoys much support from its extensive social work. The civilian 
wing of the movement is an important source of securing Hamas’s popularity with 
the Palestinian public, as social, welfare, cultural and educational activities 
constitute about 90 percent of Hamas’s work (Paz, 2001). Through these 
community services Hamas activists reach more people than they do through their 
purely religious services. The grass root mobilization through social institutions 
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and communal infrastructure means that Hamas is vulnerable to measures 
undertaken against the civilian wing e.g., closing of the institutions. Hamas draws 
support from large segments of society; from the young impoverished men with 
background in the refugee camps to the professionals and the middle class 
(Milton-Edwards, 1996:147). The movement is particularly strong among those 
coming from small towns, villages and the areas hit most heavily by the 
occupation (Ahmad, 1994: chapter 1). 
  
2.7. External Factors of Influence. 
After the Gulf war in which Arafat supported the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the 
Gulf States began to regard Hamas as an alternative to the PLO, with the result 
that economic aid formerly given to the PLO was now given to Hamas (Ahmad, 
1994: chapter 2). In addition, Arafat’s decision to support Iraq had unfortunate 
effects for 400 000 Palestinians living in Kuwait. When the war was over only 
50 000 remained in the state. Of the ones who left, some returned to the West 
Bank and Gaza, but a majority went to Jordan. As chances of finding employment 
were small and the Jordanian government proved unable to help, the Palestinians 
once again had to resort to refugee camps (Cleveland, 1999:480), thus adding to 
the already grave Palestinian refugee problem.   
The collapse of the USSR was on the one hand favorable to Hamas as it 
was seen to prove the lack of credibility of communism and Marxism. The 
credibility of leftist groups decreased and they were exposed to massive criticism. 
To the Islamists this was the evidence of the failure of secular ideologies as they 
saw the collapse as a consequence of the USSR’s rejection of Islam as a way of 
life and of the USSR fighting the mujaheddin in Afghanistan (Ahmad, 1994: 
chapter 2). When the leftist groups lost support the result was a power vacuum and 
once again Hamas was there to fill it. On the other hand the collapse was 
unfavorable in that the number of Jewish immigrants from the former USSR 
increased and more settlements were built. 
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The support for Hamas continued to grow and it was further strengthened 
by the Israeli expulsion of 400 Islamists to Lebanon in December 1992 (ibid, 
chapter 4) This expulsion, which was a response to Hamas’s attacks on Israeli 
military establishment, proved to be counterproductive as it had the opposite effect 
of what the Israeli authorities had hoped for. Instead of isolating the Islamists in a 
remote place, they received international attention and “(…) [were transformed] 
into collective martyrs” (Kristianasen, 1999:21). Some consequences were a three 
months long suspension of the ongoing peace talks between the PLO and Israel 
and increased attacks on Israeli military personnel and civilians 
 
2.8. Summary. 
The issues treated in this chapter; the way Hamas came to existence, the intifada, 
Hamas’s religious and political stands, its relationships with the nationalist 
movements and with Israel, the regional situation, the ideological voids filled by 
Hamas, its growing popularity, the failure of the Madrid Conference- all these 
factors set the stage for the Oslo agreement and the peace negotiations. We need to 
bear these factors in mind also in the following chapter in which the Declaration of 
Principles and the reactions to it will be discussed. 
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3. The Oslo Agreement and the Reactions. 
On September 13, 1993, the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government 
Arrangements (DOP), also known as the Oslo agreement, was signed in 
Washington DC by Prime Minister of Israel Yitzhak Rabin and Chairman of the 
PLO Yasser Arafat. The agreement was the result of a secret nine month long 
negotiation process, undertaken in Norway, between PLO officials and 
representatives of the state of Israel. The signing was followed by mutual letters of 
recognition between Rabin and Arafat. During the process there were many 
setbacks, but the parties were finally able to make concessions and reach 
compromises. Some of the actual achievements were the following: 
 
1. The mutual recognition and signing of treaties between Israel and the PLO on 
the establishment of the autonomous Palestinian National Authority (PNA) signed 
in May 1994 in Cairo (Kurz; Tal, 1997: chapter 3.). This agreement is also known 
as the Cairo, Oslo 1 or Gaza-Jericho Agreement. 
 
2. The actual inauguration of the PNA in the Jericho area and the Gaza Strip in 
June 1994 (ibid.). 
 
3. The return of the Palestinian leadership in exile mainly from Tunis.  
 
4. The signing in September 1995 of the so-called Oslo II Israeli-Palestinian 
Agreement, also known as the Taba Agreement, but formally known as the Interim 
Agreement, in which principles of elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council 
in the territories were set. (Kurz; Tal, 1997: chapter 3).  
 
5. The election of 88 representatives to the Palestinian Legislative Council with 
jurisdiction over the West Bank and Gaza (Waage, 2004: 136, 137) and for the 
president of the PNA in January 1996.  
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Succeeding the negotiations there would be a five year interim or 
transitional period, to be concluded in 1999. In the first phase of this period Israeli 
troops would gradually withdraw from Palestinian centers in the Jericho area and 
Gaza and transfer its incumbent administrative power to the PNA (Cleveland, 
1999:488). In the next phase the elected Council would assume responsibility in 
five areas, concerning matters of education and culture, health, social welfare, 
direct taxation and tourism, and the creation of a Palestinian police force would 
start (DOP, article VI). In this phase the Israeli military would also be redeployed 
to unpopulated areas of the West Bank (Cleveland, 1999:488). The interim period 
would eventually lead to final peace settlement. Sensitive issues were postponed to 
the Final Status Negotiations. These negotiations were scheduled to start “as soon 
as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period, 
between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian people representatives” 
(DOP, article V). 
When the agreement was made public it was received by a range of 
reactions. The Washington negotiations, initiated in Madrid, had reached a 
stalemate and the DOP took the world by surprise. While Arab leaders endorsed it, 
although initially upset for having being excluded from the process (Cleveland, 
1999:488), the reception on the Palestinian arena was not that welcoming. 
Professor Edward Said, a leading Palestinian intellectual, called the DOP a 
“Palestinian Versailles”, because by signing it Arafat had surrendered 78 percent 
of what was Palestinian land in 1948, in addition to West Jerusalem which was 40 
percent Arab (Said, 2003:45). Said criticized the Palestinian leaders for having 
made all the concession unilaterally. The only matter Israel gave up was Jericho 
and Gaza, overpopulated and poor Gaza being an area that Rabin some months 
prior to the signing had wished “(…) would sink into the sea” (ibid, 46). Thus in 
Said’s opinion the DOP constituted no risk to the Israelis because their concession 
was of no substantial value to them. 
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An important source of criticism was that the negotiations had been 
conducted in secret and thus there had been no public debate about the DOP prior 
to late August when its content was revealed in the press (Jensen, 2002:45.). The 
reason given behind the secrecy was that reaching an agreement would have been 
impossible with public awareness and involvement. Up until then the parts had 
denied the existence of secret negotiations as well as of such a deal (Baskin, 
2002)6. When it was made public there were people on both sides who felt 
excluded and deceived and within the leadership of the PLO there were people 
who resigned in protest (Waage, 2004:152).  
Parts of the criticism focused upon the fact that the agreement was very 
unclear. The Palestinian spokeswoman and delegate to the Madrid Conference, 
Hanan Ashrawi, was chocked by its vagueness and believed it had “(…) many 
potentially explosive areas and could be to [the Palestinians’] disadvantage” 
(Ashrawi quoted from Waage, 2004:139). One of the explosive areas was the 
postponement of the issue of Jerusalem to the Final Status Negotiations. Ashrawi 
feared that the postponement would give the Israelis time to create facts on the 
ground as there were no guarantees against this (ibid, 139). This would most likely 
effect the final outcome. Another weak point concerned the refugees, which was 
also a matter deferred to the Final Status Negotiations7.  
The Arab economist and intellectual Burhan Dajani (1994:14) criticizes the 
agreement by pointing to that beyond the transfer of authority to the PNA and the 
creation of the new police force, everything is subject to negotiations. Very little is 
decided on a permanent basis. He argues that in order to implement the programs 
and reforms scheduled in the DOP at least four other major agreements on 
elections, on the withdrawal, on the interim period and on economic matters, 
would have to be negotiated during the interim phase. This illustrates the 
vagueness of the agreement. Dajani also criticizes that while the PLO was 
                                                 
6 See chapter named “Lesson Learned: The public must be involved and informed”.  
7 The matter of the refugees and of Jerusalem will be discussed at further length respectively in Chapter 4 
and 6. 
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recognized only as a negotiation partner to Israel the PLO recognized Israel as a 
sovereign state with no fixed borders which means the borders are not confined to 
those set in 1967 (ibid, 7). This could be one of the explosive subjects Ashrawi 
referred to. 
Waage (2004:139) argues that the deal was made on Israel’s terms and this 
seems to be a shared opinion among the skeptics of the agreement. According to 
Cleveland (1999:491) the asymmetric relationship between the parts made it 
impossible for the PLO to accomplish anything but the “peace of the weak”. He 
argues that Israel was the occupying power and could continue to be so with 
impunity, because the DOP fell outside the realms of UN resolutions or 
enforcement mechanisms, as it was negotiated between two parts alone and not 
under the auspices of the UN (ibid, 495, 496). Potential disputes were to be 
resolved through the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee (DOP, article X) 
and if the negotiations proved unsuccessful then the issues would be resolved by 
methods “agreed upon by the parties” (article XV). 
Even though there was much criticism a majority of the Palestinians did in 
fact support the agreement when it was made public. In an opinion poll from 
September 1993, 68.6 percent of the respondents agreed with the DOP and 60.1 
percent believed it constituted a realistic step that might lead towards a Palestinian 
state. 72.9 percent were supportive of negotiations between Israel and the PLO 
whereas 25 percent opposed them and 2.1 had a different opinion. In addition 46.5 
percent experienced a growth in confidence towards the PLO as a result of the 
signing versus 19.1 who reduced their confidence (JMCC, 1993). Parts of the 
optimism can be explained by the actual achievements mentioned earlier and by 
the hope the DOP provided in terms of financial aid; in the immediate aftermath of 
the signing there were promises from the international community to contribute to 
what the Palestinians hoped could be a sovereign state (Waage, 2004:152). There 
was also hope that the self-ruled areas could be the starting point of a future state 
(ibid, 139). Another positive aspect of the agreement was that the Palestinians as a 
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group were recognized by the world community. This too strengthened the dream 
of a sovereign state. In addition the DOP had some regional impact in that it led to, 
among other things, a peace agreement between Jordan and Israel in 1994 and a 
stabilization of the relationship between Israel and other Arab states (Cleveland, 
1999:483). Other developments associated with the Oslo process were the Hebron 
Protocol of 1997, the Wye accord of 1998, and the Sharm al-Sheik memorandum 
of 1999, all dealing with Israeli redeployment. 
It seems that these achievements were not sufficient to keep the agreement 
alive. There were serious drawbacks and the immediate optimistic sentiments the 
DOP generated had already waned substantially by January 1994. Opinion polls 
from this month reveal that only 45.3 percent now supported the DOP whereas 
39.8 percent opposed it. 24.3 percent say their support decreased, 26.1 say it 
remained the same, for 22.6 percent their opposition grew and only 9.8 report that 
their support increased (JMCC, 1994). So although there were immediate support 
the criticism grew stronger and stronger.  
 
3.1. Hamas’s Reactions. 
One of the leading voices in the opposition camp belonged to Hamas activists and 
supporters, according to whom Arafat had sold the Palestinian cause to the 
Zionists (Nüsse, 1998:149). On September 5, a short time after the content of the 
DOP had been announced in August 1993, Hamas issued its leaflet number 102 in 
which it condemned the agreement and encouraged the Palestinians not to be 
deceived by the Palestinian leaders who would do their outmost to put the DOP in 
a good light. The leadership was harshly criticized for representing no one but 
themselves and putting aside the interests of the Palestinian people. The leaflet 
further stated:  
(…)We will therefore insist on ruining this agreement and continue the resistance 
struggle and our Jihad against the occupation power. We reject any action which 
will lead to a Palestinian civil war, not least because the consequence would only 
benefit our Zionist enemy. The leadership of Arafat carries the responsibility for 
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destroying the Palestinian society and for sowing the seeds of discord and division 
among the Palestinians (Hamas in Jensen, 2002:45)8.  
 
Hamas, although careful to avoid civil war, responded to the agreement with 
raising its violent struggle against Israel and intensifying its competition with the 
PLO (Kurz; Tal, 1997: chapter 2). The fight against Israel was among other things 
manifested in a sharp rise in bombings, kidnappings and suicide operations. From 
September 1993 until December 1996 a total of 202 Israelis were killed in terrorist 
attacks compared to 164 during the period from December 1987 up until the 
signing. Suicide bombs alone killed 128 and injured 638. Hamas and Islamic Jihad 
resumed responsibility for respectively 80 fatalities and 395 injured and 48 killed 
and 243 injured (ibid, chapter 3). From this we can infer that perpetrating attacks 
against Israel came to represents an important aspect of the resistance to Oslo.    
The increased competition with the PLO will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
Suffice here to mention that following the signing Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine and six other Palestinian groups came together to form an 
anti-Oslo coalition. They refused to recognize the decisions of the PLO regarding 
the accord and intended to boycott the PLO institutions (ibid.). However, it was 
soon clear that the ideological differences between the groups of this rejection 
front were too great for any fruitful cooperation to happen and the attempt of 
fighting Oslo together by advancing a common cause proved too difficult. 
That Hamas rejected the agreement had much importance in that the PLO 
now could expect massive resistance because of Hamas’s strength and the 
activists’ ability to mobilize support. It was also important in that Hamas now had 
a very difficult task ahead. It had to choose between ideological faithfulness and 
ideological flexibility and depending on what the movement decided to do it could 
be facing enemies in the PLO, among the Palestinians, in Israel and in the world 
community. 
                                                 
8 My translation. 
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4. Political Reasons of Opposition. 
The Oslo agreement, to a large extent, dealt with economical and political matters 
which had to be replied to on these premises. This was recognized also by Hamas. 
Thus, according to Nüsse (1998:146) the movement’s main argumentation against 
the agreement was based upon politics, but it is important to have in mind that the 
political objections have economic, military and social aspects to them.  
The DOP greatly influenced the possibility of achieving a free Palestine. A 
free Palestine for Hamas is an independent Islamic Palestine in the area from the 
Mediterranean Sea to the river Jordan (Hamas in Hroub, 2002:295), for the 
Palestinian people (Marzuq in Hroub, 2002:70). The influence was felt in various 
ways and Hamas’s most serious objections concerned the agreement’s failure to 
address the basic claims of the Palestinians (Mishal; Sela, 2000:109). The 
following discussion will focus upon matters that made the agreement inadequate 
as well as unacceptable in the eyes of Hamas.  
 
4.1. Refugees. 
One such claim concerns the future of the Palestinian refugees. “The most 
important objective of Hamas is to end the tragedy of the Palestinians, a majority 
of whom are living in camps (…)” (al-Rantisi quoted from Gaess, 2002). The 
agreement is very vague in regard of the refugees. It says very little about what 
would happen to them. While article XII and annex I mention the people displaced 
in 1967 and defer the issue to the Final Status Negotiations, the refugees from 
1948 are not mentioned at all. Edward Said (2003:32) argues that 1967 just 
completed the Israeli conquest and that 1948 is the year when the Palestinians’ 
search for self-determination really began. That was the year when 78 percent of 
historic Arab Palestine became Israeli (ibid, 38) and according to Israeli archives 
800 000 people were driven out (ibid, 147). Their descendants today amount to 
seven and a half million people throughout the world (ibid, 31) many of whom 
 39
still live in refugee camps. According to Ismail Abu Shanab, a senior official of 
the Hamas political wing in Gaza, the only solution to the refugee problem is an 
implementation of UN General Assembly resolution 194 (Shanab in Gaess, 2002). 
The resolution states the refugees’ right to return to their homes, something which 
is also stated in article 13 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human rights, and 
the right to be compensated for property lost or damaged (UN, 1948). Neither 
resolution 194 nor article 13 is mentioned in the DOP. The formerly mentioned 
UN resolution 242 (1967), accepted by the PNC in 1988, is however, included. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2 the resolution calls for “(…) respect for and 
acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence 
and peace for every State in the area (…) (article 1ii). It also affirms the necessity 
of a just settlement of the refugee problem (article 2b). The inclusion of this 
resolution in the DOP does not clarify who the refugees are, because the resolution 
does not specify whether it refers to the people from the area that became Israel in 
1948 or the people from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967. It does not say 
what constitutes a just settlement either. That the DOP is so vague both concerning 
who the refugees are and concerning this group’s future, is problematic because 
the question about what was to happen with the refugees and their descendants is 
central in Palestinian society, and equally important to Hamas. Many of Hamas’s 
members live in refugee camps and this was also true for several of the leaders, 
such as Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and Abdul Aziz al-Rantisi who grew up in refugee 
camps on the Gaza Strip. The fact that so many have a background as refugees 
makes it reasonable to believe that personal experience have influenced the 
movement’s view on the matter and the way they perceive the solution. According 
to Jensen (2002:62) Hamas is the voice of more than four million refugees’ right 
to return. Israel has refused to acknowledge this right and this has, according to 
Shanab “(…) made Palestinian refugees more determined to struggle to realize 
that right” (Shanab quoted from Gaess, 2002). Many Palestinians perceive a return 
to Palestine as the only possible way of terminating the refugee status. This idea 
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must be seen in connection with that their identity as Palestinians has been 
nurtured by their deprived position in their host countries and in the refugee 
camps, as Jordan is the only country which has granted them citizenship 
(Cleveland, 1999:349). Palestinians today is the largest disenfranchised group of 
refugees since World War II still in existence and still living in refugee camps 
(Said, 2003:96).  
Parts of the Hamas Charter concern the fate of the refugees. They are not 
discussed in that term, rather referred to as “uprooted people” and the Charter 
states that only with Islam prevailing can people return to their right places and 
homelands be retrieved (article 9). From this we see that Hamas perceives the 
victory of Islam, the Islamization of society, as a solution to the problem, and this 
is a precondition for the refugees’ return. The establishment of an Islamic state is 
not the plan of the DOP9. Furthermore Hamas stresses that the enemy has forced 
the Palestinians into exile and this is equal to murder (article 20). On Hamas’s 
online homepage Hamas spokesman Nawahidhah, (n.d) says that what has been 
done to the Palestinians is the “worst type of oppression, transgression and tyranny 
that could happen to any nation”. The question of the refugees can be discussed in 
relation with the Charter’s strong social component. Hamas perceives itself as 
having a leading part in taking social responsibility for the people of Palestine, 
including the refugees, and emphasizes the Islamic society as one of solidarity; 
“(…) It is incumbent upon the members of Hamas to look after the interests of the 
masses (…) and they must avoid playing with anything that might effect the future 
generations or cause damage to their society” (article 21). It is clear from the 
stances taken by Hamas regarding its desire of an Islamic society and its relation 
to Israel that the Oslo agreement is seen as something which will indeed effect 
future generations and cause damage to society. Hamas sees it as its duty to 
support the weak and provide a defence to all the oppressed (article 10). To 
opponents of the DOP, among them Hamas, one reason to object was that it was 
                                                 
9 I will get back to this in Chapter 6.  
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unacceptable that the destinies of so many people were left out from the 
agreement, although concerning the 1967 refugees, not on a permanent basis. By 
failing to provide a solution for so many Palestinians the DOP, in Hamas’s 
opinion, did not lead towards the establishment of a Palestinian state for all 
Palestinians. 
It makes sense to say that the resistance towards Oslo, on the question of 
the refugees, is two-levelled. On one level we see that Hamas objected to the 
agreement because the movement believed the refugee problem only could be 
solved with an Islamization of society and this would not happen with the 
implementation of the DOP. This solution is a final, long-term solution. However, 
on another level, Hamas objected because the issue was not adequately addressed. 
This level is more practically oriented and deals more with immediate concerns. 
On the way to an Islamized society Hamas would accept measures that could 
improve the situation of the refugees, such as resolution 194. So in the regard of 
the refugees I find that the most important objection concerns the agreement’s 
failure to address the issue. 
 
4.2. Future Palestinian State. 
A second basic claim of the Palestinians is that of a sovereign state. Hamas vision 
of Palestine from the Mediterranean to the river Jordan corresponds with the 
borders from the mandate period. This was by no means what was envisaged in 
the agreement. Of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, which constitute 22 percent 
of historic Palestine, Israel still had control over 40 percent of the former and 60 
percent of the latter (Said, 2004:38). The Oslo agreement would give the 
Palestinians limited self rule in Gaza and Jericho. Then could not the DOP be seen 
as one step leading towards the goal; the establishment of a free Palestinian state? 
A problem with this was that the agreement did not really deal with the 
establishment of an independent Palestinian state at all. Waage (2004:138) points 
to the fact that there was nothing that pointed towards a future state. However, 
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seen in an optimistic light article III, concerning elections, may be interpreted as 
vague references to a possible future Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and the 
West Bank, because it put forward some electoral conditions that had to be 
fulfilled in order for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to govern 
themselves10. It is in these emphasized words one may see the reference. This was 
however conditional upon a future transfer of more powers to the Palestinian than 
those explicitly laid out in the accord, i.e., in the five areas of education and 
culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation and tourism.  
For the PLO the agreement, despite its lack of references to Palestinian 
sovereignty, appears to have constituted a step on the road to statehood because to 
the organization it represented an acceptable two-state solution with self rule in 
Gaza and Jericho. The acceptance of a two-state solution was consistent with the 
PNC’s decision in 1988. Hamas did not perceive the DOP to be one step on the 
way, because the agreement did not make adequate provisions for a future state. 
According to opponents of the agreement it did, if not lead in the opposite 
direction, i.e., to less self rule, then at least it led to a “[consolidation of] the Israeli 
occupation with Palestinian acquiescence; it gave the Israelis sovereignty, control 
over water, security, external relations, and the veto power in everything of 
consequence occurring in the autonomous areas” (Said quoted from Rabbani, 
1995:61). They believed that Israel now had received a helping hand in enforcing 
its occupation and settlement policies in Palestine. Dr. Souad Dajani (n.d.)11 
argues that with the DOP came a normalization of the relations between occupied 
and occupier. The Israeli occupation was not removed; rather it was now managed 
by the PNA and the police force. These concerns were also shared by Hamas. 
Mahmoud al-Zahar, one of Hamas’s founders and top leaders in Gaza, stated that 
“(…) the Israelis still occupy 40 percent of our area in Gaza and they still control 
the passages between North and South, our daily life and our economy.  We are 
                                                 
10 My emphasis. 
11 See paragraph named “Implications” in the chapter named “The Declaration of Principles”. 
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against the agreement because the occupation continues (…)”12 (al-Zahar quoted 
from Meidell, n.d.). Furthermore, according to Musa Abu Marzuq, the head of 
Hamas’s political bureau, the occupation did not just continue, rather it was 
legalized through the agreement because “(…) it doesn’t call for its end nor the 
end of the Zionist settlement policy” (Marzuq quoted from Nüsse, 1998:146).  
In which ways did the occupation continue then? One side to this was that 
the DOP does not address Israel’s claim to the Occupied Territories. Another side 
concerned the settlement policy which was of major importance to the 
Palestinians. In 1992 the newly elected Prime Minister, Rabin announced a freeze 
on planned settlement constructions. This was a result of American pressure to 
halt the building of all settlements and of US denial of loan in case of the policy 
continuing (Cleveland, 1999:485). However, after the signing of the DOP Rabin 
ended the freeze and between 1993 and 1995, 20 000 acres of land on the West 
Bank were confiscated (ibid, 491). There is no explicit reference to a cessation of 
settlement constructions in the DOP, something which was considered a major 
flaw by the Palestinian critics.    
Another side concerned that the already limited self rule was further 
restricted by the fact that “[the] withdrawal of the military government [from the 
Gaza Strip and Jericho area would] not prevent Israel from exercising the powers 
and responsibilities not transferred to the Council” (agreed minute to the DOP). 
That meant Israel was free to act in all other spheres than education and culture, 
health, social welfare, direct taxation and tourism. Waage (2004:137) argues that 
the Israelis still were in full control over the use of roads, water resources, Israeli 
settlements, etc. for the entire interim period from May 1994 until May 1999, 
because although the military forces withdrew from Gaza and Jericho, they still 
surrounded them in order to protect the settlements, and they could at any time 
reoccupy them. This is consistent with the agreed minutes to the DOP which states 
that Israel will still have the overall internal and external responsibility for the 
                                                 
12 My translation. 
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security of Israelis. Seen in this light one may understand that Hamas leader al-
Zahar finds the agreement to be a safety agreement for Israel and not a peace 
process (Meidell, n.d.).  
The discussion on refugees and statehood can be seen in connection with 
the paragraphs of the DOP that concerns rights. According to opponents of the 
agreement it did not in an adequate way address the issue of legitimate rights of 
the Palestinians. Article III of the DOP concerning elections establishes that the 
elections to be held for the Palestinian Legislative Council will be a “(…) step 
toward the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people”. In the 
introduction both parties recognize mutual legitimate and political rights. This is 
specified in Israel’s case by Arafat’s letter to Rabin, in which Arafat on behalf of 
the PLO recognizes the “(…) right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and 
security” (Arafat in Abbas, 1995:238). A problem for the Palestinians part, 
however, is that nowhere in the DOP are these rights defined, so one may wonder 
what kind of rights it refers to. According to Dajani (1994:8) the only right 
conceded to the Palestinians was the right of being represented by the PLO. In 
return Israel was, as mentioned, recognized as a sovereign state with no fixed 
borders. 
  The Hamas Charter does not deal extensively with rights, but in a 
memorandum from Hamas to the delegates at the Sharm al-Sheik Conference in 
March 1996 the movement states that the Palestinian people’s most important 
rights are the right of self-determination, of an independent state and the return of 
the refugees and displaced persons to their homes (Hamas in Hroub, 2002:306). 
For these rights to be fulfilled, Hamas sees the Islamization of society as a 
prerequisite. 
Seen in light of the agreement’s lack of references to the refugees’ future 
and of an independent state and given that the DOP did not provide for an 
Islamization of society, Hamas found the agreement to be inadequate as well as 
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unjust. The DOP did not in this regard prepare the grounds for the free Palestinian 
state of Hamas’s wishes.  
 
4.3. Economy.  
Mahmoud al-Zahar said after the signing that “(…) [the future for Gaza under self 
rule will be] social and economical catastrophe. We will be incapable of creating a 
healthy economic growth and we will be dependent upon the Israeli economy. 
This is clear from the agreement”13 (al-Zahar quoted from Meidell, n.d.). What did 
al-Zahar refer to by this? In which ways was the DOP economically unfortunate 
for the Palestinians? This relates to a third basic claim which concerns the creation 
of a sustainable economy capable of surviving. Hamas resisted the DOP on 
economical terms because in the movement’s view the agreement was very 
economically beneficial to Israel (Nüsse, 1998:145-147). Hamas believed Israel 
had made concessions with the objective of breaking the Arab boycott and 
establishing economic relations to these countries, in order to gain access to new 
energy resources (ibid, 146). These were ideas shared by other Oslo critics without 
affiliation to Hamas, such as the leader of Gaza’s Development Group, Salah Abd 
al-Shafi who stated that: 
 [the Israelis wanted the Palestinians to act] as a bridge for the Israelis to enter 
Arab markets. Such integration is the precondition if Israel is to in any way 
become an economic as much as a military power in the region (Usher, 1994:13).  
 
One area in which Israel would be the beneficiary was in the taxation field. Dajani 
(1994:17) argues that an economic concern was the DOP’s provision that the 
Palestinians would be responsible for direct taxation, primarily income taxes. As 
the Council only would be responsible for direct taxation and the indirect taxes 
such as customs fees and value added tax were outside its jurisdiction, this would 
have unfortunate consequences for the Palestinians, because according to Dajani it 
is the indirect taxes that generate most government revenue. A result of this was 
                                                 
13 My translation. 
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that also on the taxation field Israel seemed to be the economical winner and it 
further meant a continuing Israeli presence on areas where these taxes were to be 
collected such as crossing points and factories. 
The DOP stipulates the development of a number of authorities, among 
others, a Palestinian Development Bank and a Palestinian Export Promotion Board 
in order to promote economic growth (article VII). Another concern was that the 
authorities mentioned in the article, seven in all, fall outside the already mentioned 
five areas over which the Palestinian Council would take responsibility. However, 
although not specified, they could be established under the planned economic 
development and stabilization program (annex II) or under the Israeli-Palestinian 
continuing Committee for Economic Cooperation, which seeks to cooperate in 
areas such as water, electricity, finance, energy and trade (article XI, annex III). 
This means that economic development is contingent on the establishment of one 
of these two. Furthermore it is dependent upon the cooperation between Israel and 
the PLO. In other words with the agreement economic development became 
subordinated joint control with the key word being cooperation. In this Hamas saw 
the danger of the Palestinians being overrun in economical matters by Israel in 
cases of disagreement, because in a joint control situation it is a great chance that 
the stronger part will have the last word. The power relationship between Israel 
and the PLO is asymmetric with Israel being the strongest part, both in terms of 
economic and military power. “(…) [To place] development funds in a joint 
framework (…) is tantamount to subordinating development to Israeli control” 
(Dajani, 1994:11).  
 
4.4. Inconsistency with UN Resolutions. 
Hamas also objected to Oslo on the grounds that it was inconsistent with the UN 
resolution 242 of 1967 (Mishal; Sela, 2000:69). A number of comments are 
appropriate with respect to this. First, resolution 242 as well as 338, were included 
in the DOP and even though Hamas had never accepted them the movement now 
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used them to fight the DOP. Second, the resolutions, according to Waage 
(2004:138), “(…) were so ambiguous and vaguely formulated that they would 
have to be subject to major negotiations themselves”. The vagueness of 242 (UN, 
1967) is demonstrated in that it is not clear which territories fall inside the 
jurisdiction of the resolution. It points to respect for states in the area, something 
that can be interpreted to exclude the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, as they are 
not states. Furthermore, the mere inclusion of the resolution gives the impression 
that the conflict started in 1967, something to which many people would have 
strong objections. Article I of the DOP states that one of the objectives of the 
negotiations is to “(…) establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority 
(…) leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolution 242 
and 338”. Resolution 242, article 1:i, stipulates among other things the Israeli 
military withdrawal from territories occupied in the war of 1967 (UN, 1967). 
Resolution 338 (UN, 1973) is basically a reinforcement of 242. The DOP article 
number I further states that the Final Status Negotiations will lead to the 
implementation of the resolutions. This is problematic because it makes the 
implementation dependent upon the success of these Final Status Negotiations. 
Third, the use of the word “withdrawal” is worthy of a comment. In the DOP 
article V, VI and annex II, which specifies the articles, speak of a military 
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. Within four months after the 
signing the Israeli withdrawal from these areas would be completed (Waage, 
2004:136). It is worth noticing that only when it comes to the Gaza Strip and 
Jericho does the DOP deal with a complete withdrawal. Elsewhere in the 
declaration one discusses only a redeployment of Israeli forces to unpopulated 
areas (article XIII). A problem concerning this is that the Jericho area is not 
specified, but eventually it was confined to the small town of Jericho. This again is 
an example of the DOP’s vagueness, and an effect of the vagueness was that it was 
interpreted differently by the Israelis and the Palestinians. Also in this failure to 
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specify and agree on the exact terms of the redeployment does Hamas see a 
continuation of the occupation. 
The reason why Hamas had never accepted the resolutions was not because 
the movement rejected the part, mentioned above, that concerns the Israeli 
withdrawal. The resolutions were rejected based on the matters discussed in 
Chapter 2. I do not find it likely that Hamas objected to the agreement because it 
was, if not a violation of, then at least inconsistent with these resolutions, after all 
in the eyes of Hamas they were illegal because they recognized Israel. It is more 
probable that they used the fact that there was an inconsistency as a pretext to 
argue against the DOP because Hamas was eager to fight the accords with any 
means necessary. In other words, it is not reasonable to believe that an underlying 
reason of Hamas’s opposition to Oslo was that the agreement violated the UN 
resolutions. 
 
4.5. Summary.  
So how did the agreement influence the possibility of achieving a free Palestine? 
In the case of the refugees’ fate the DOP depicts nothing but uncertainty. The 
agreement was perceived to almost take a step backwards when it comes to the 
possibilities of a future independent state, because not only does it lack provisions 
for the establishment of one, but according to critics it constitutes a consolidation 
of the occupation as well as a Palestinian recognition of it. There is also a 
Palestinian acceptance of Israeli power in the areas over which the PNA assumed 
control, because Israel still had the ultimate control and responsibilities. A free 
state is dependent upon, if not economic independence, then at least not a 
complete dependency. The agreement was perceived to be economically 
disadvantageous for the Palestinians and it was Israel that would be the beneficiary 
also in the economical field. As seen, political objections were not particular to 
Hamas. The movement shared their reservations and opposition with large 
segments of the Palestinian political organization and society in general.   
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 5. Tactical Reasons of Opposition. 
In their book “The Palestinian Hamas. Vision, Violence and Coexistence” (2000) 
Mishal and Sela discuss several reasons behind Hamas’s opposition to the DOP. 
One of these reasons is related to the raison d’être of Hamas, as “[Hamas] 
perceived the Oslo accord and the 1994 Cairo agreement as a strategic threat to its 
very existence” (Mishal; Sela, 2000:72). Mishal and Sela argue that there were 
several important reasons for this, firstly, that the agreement put an end to the 
intifada. Secondly, it constrained Hamas’s use of jihad as a military strategy to 
reach the goal of a free Palestine. Thirdly, the agreement led to the creation of and 
competition with the PNA and to increased competition with the PLO (ibid, 67). 
The arguments are closely related; the intifada was presented as a form of jihad 
and the military restrictions largely influenced Hamas’s relationship with the PNA 
and PLO. In the following I will discuss the reason why the agreement was seen as 
a threat to Hamas’s existence. First I will discuss the movement’s relationship 
with the uprising, then move on to the significance of jihad, before I finally deal 
with the relationship between Hamas and the PNA. 
 
5.1. The Relationship between Hamas and the Intifada. 
As already mentioned Hamas was founded during the first months of the first 
Palestinian intifada as a response to the Muslim Brotherhood’s increased need of 
engaging more directly in the political national resistance against Israel. Mishal 
and Sela (2000:67) argue that “[the intifada] had provided Hamas with ideal 
conditions to become a genuine political alternative to the PLO”. Ahmad (1994) 
argues that this happened in the way that the uprising became a channel through 
which Hamas could advocate its religious-political message and reach a broad 
audience. By using the intifada as a springboard “(…) Hamas leapt into public and 
political life (…)” and thus created “(…) the strongest Islamic resistance force in 
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the Occupied Territories (…)” and became a fully fledged political rival to the 
nationalist movements (Ahmad, 1994: introduction).  
According to Nüsse (1998:68) Hamas took the credit for having started the 
uprising in the Gaza Strip and later having it spread to the West Bank. Based on 
statements from several Hamas leaders Nüsse argues that the movement existed 
secretly before the outbreak of the intifada and that Hamas constituted the “head 
of the intifada”. If it proved to be the truth, or at least the perceived truth, that it 
was in fact created by Hamas, then which implications would this have? Nüsse 
points to that this tactic allowed Hamas to stamp the intifada as an Islamic 
phenomenon since its beginnings (ibid.). If the uprising was religiously motivated 
then this could have some positive effects for Hamas. In the case of it succeeding 
Hamas would be able to take the credit and possibly become more popular. It 
would also give the intifada a deeper religious character which could be   
favorable to Hamas in that it could strengthen the idea that religion constitutes 
powerful, useful and acceptable means in the struggle against Israel. This could 
likely have given the movement more support, possibly more members and a 
chance of political ascendancy. 
Ahmad (1994) does not share Nüsse’s point of view that Hamas started the 
intifada, but rather believes that while it is unlikely that Hamas had existed at all 
without its outbreak and the subsequent need of the Muslim Brotherhood to show 
greater engagement in the national struggle, it is also true that Hamas constituted a 
strong force to help shape the course of the uprising. “While Hamas became an 
important power behind the intifada, the intifada itself became a reality on which 
Hamas could not turn its back” (ibid, chapter 1). This quote illustrates the 
interdependent relationship between the movement and the uprising. Hamas’s 
important role in the uprising can also be seen in relation with the Brothers’ prior 
nonparticipation on the political arena in Palestine. Because the Muslim Brothers 
had no strong tradition of engaging in political activities Hamas could now put all 
its emphasis and concentrate solely on intifada activities. The activists did not 
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have to have in mind considerations for other political activities since they had not 
been very politically active earlier.  
According to Ahmad (ibid.) one way through which Hamas was solidifying 
the uprising was through its publications of leaflets and communiqués filled with 
religious teachings and convictions, which had an impact both on the individual 
level as it shaped thought processes of the people, and also affected the work of 
the United National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU). The UNLU was a 
committee consisting of all the main secular political organizations and it was 
established to achieve the objectives of the intifada. Hamas remained outside it 
because the UNLU was associated with the PLO and because Hamas also wanted 
to preserve its ideological and organizational distinctness (Kurz; Tal, 1997: 
chapter 2). The secularist groups now had to deal with an increasingly popular 
religious group and its demands and directives in addition to the other matters that 
were always on their agenda, e.g., relations with Israel and the concerns of the 
Palestinians and the Palestinian society in general. 
  Ahmad (1994: chapter 1) sees the movement and the uprising as 
interdependent and mutually reinforcing each other, but he argues that Hamas was 
careful not to link its future with that of the intifada. He believes that Hamas 
successfully used the intifada to create a space for itself even in a non-intifada 
future. In his opinion the uprising constitutes but one phase in the Palestinian 
history while Hamas managed to generate sufficient power and support to be a 
long term actor, even in the case of the intifada coming to an end. Hamas, both 
fueled by and fueling the intifada, managed to inject its ideas into the Palestinian 
society and thereby permeating its fabric and contributing to a political 
transformation of Palestinian society, “(…) in a manner which qualifies it as a 
force whose effect could go far beyond the impact made by the intifada” (ibid.). 
The survival or future of Hamas then, is in his view not dependent on the success 
or failure of the uprising and the Oslo agreement cannot then be said to be a threat 
for ending the uprising. 
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5.1.1. Status of Mass Organization in Peril. 
Ahmad’s opinion, about Hamas being sufficiently independent of the intifada to 
survive without it, stands in sharp contrast to Mishal’s and Sela’s (2000:72) views 
on the matter. In their opinion Hamas saw the continuation of the intifada as 
existential for its own survival. The two were inextricably intertwined, as Hamas’s 
popularity was thought to be linked to its achievements in the intifada. 
The reason why the uprising was seen as vital to the movement must be 
seen in view of Hamas’s fear of losing its status as a mass organization in the case 
of the intifada coming to an end. Hamas, at least the Izz al-Din al-Qassam 
Brigades, which constitutes the official military apparatus of the movement, is to a 
very large extent based on the struggle against Israel for the liberation of Palestine. 
Accepting the Oslo agreement, which would put an end to the intifada and the 
decade long struggle, would mean compromising Hamas’s ideology. It would 
break with the Charter in which a number of articles deal with the continuation of 
the struggle14. It would also constitute a breach of Hamas’s promise of not giving 
up one single inch of Palestine (Charter, article 6).  
The resistance against Israel and the liberation of Palestine are all-
encompassing elements in Hamas’s Charter, so giving up the struggle would mean 
abandoning own Charter and ideology. The issue, however, also has less dogmatic 
and more political-pragmatic aspects to it. An acceptance of the agreement and 
thereby of the peace process would not only have meant an end to the intifada but 
also that Hamas would have had to recognize that other groups were in charge of 
the peace process. Hamas would then have had to cede power over and 
responsibility for the Palestinian people and society to these groups. This was a 
threat because Hamas then ran a great risk of being marginalized on the 
Palestinian political arena. It was also contradictory to the formerly mentioned 
article 21 of the Charter which concerns Hamas’s social responsibility to look after 
what the movement believes are the interests of the masses.  
                                                 
14 Among others, articles: 3, 7, 13 and 14 of the Hamas Charter.  
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As already discussed in Chapter 2, Hamas’s popularity increased with the 
nationalist movements’ abandonment of nationalist objectives. It did not want to 
commit, in its own view, the same mistake as the nationalist movements. Hamas 
was soon perceived as one of the groups most firmly opposed to Israel. It did 
without doubt benefit largely in terms of support from this firm resistance and its 
status could have been lost if it did not stick to the struggle. Contrary to Ahmad, 
Mishal and Sela also see Hamas’s future popularity depending on this, - on the 
continuation of the struggle and the intifada. Hamas’s status as a mass 
organization would be lost because there would simply be no need for Hamas as a 
political organization in a non-intifada future. Thus everything designed to stop 
this struggle or resistance from taking place was seen as a very serious threat to 
the movement.  
There were also other pragmatic concerns Hamas had to take into 
considerations. The fear of losing support and then risking marginalization had 
another side to it. Internally Hamas faced a dilemma. The movement could on the 
one hand stay faithful to its own ideology, as it is expressed through the Charter, 
and continue its struggle against Israel. In this way it would risk losing popular 
support from lots of Palestinians who according to opinion polls to a large extent 
supported the peace process. On the other hand; Hamas also faced losing support 
if it did not stick to its own Charter and beliefs but rather followed a more 
pragmatic line by accepting the support of the agreement represented through the 
opinion polls and thereby the peace process. In either way Hamas would lose 
adherents. 
While the relationship between Hamas and the intifada is very strong there 
is no consensus on the exact nature of this relationship. There is no conclusive 
answer to whether Hamas started the intifada or whether the intifada would have 
existed or continued without Hamas. Now in retrospect we know that Ahmad was 
right in his belief that the movement would survive even if the uprising did not. 
There was a strong relationship between the two, but whether Hamas was more 
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dependent upon the uprising or vice versa is uncertain. I find it doubtful that the 
intifada would have been as strong as it was without Hamas, because Hamas 
constituted a very strong force that exerted great influence on other groups and 
mobilized people to join.  
 
5.2. Restraints on Military Activity. 
“[Hamas will] not accept that the PLO has the right to lay down conditions about, 
say, Hamas’s military operations against the occupation” (Bassam Jarrar, West 
Bank leader of Hamas, quoted from Nüsse, 1998:150).  
Mishal and Sela (2000:67) also argue that the Oslo agreement was seen as a 
strategic threat because with it Hamas was no longer free to operate militarily as it 
wanted to. As already seen in Chapter 2 the PLO committed itself to desist from 
hostile actions against Israel in 1988, and this was reaffirmed with the DOP and 
Arafat’s letter to Rabin in 1993 in which he as mentioned recognized Israel’s right 
to exist in peace and security (Arafat in Abbas, 1995:238). By doing this he at the 
same time rendered the liberation struggle and the objective of a free Palestine to 
be less important than Israel’s right to exist in peace. As fighting Israel is an 
essential part of Hamas’s doing it is not something the movement will willingly 
abandon, but with the DOP and the following letter of recognition Hamas activists 
became liable to punishment from the Palestinian side for continuing something, 
not only they, but large segments of the Palestinian society, regarded as a 
legitimate struggle for political rights. The agreement thus represented a restriction 
of Hamas’s freedom of action concerning the movement’s use of jihad as a 
strategy to fight Israel in order to reach the goal of a free Palestine. In addition it 
very possibly represented confrontations with the PNA as this was the body that 
would take over responsibility and see to that the commitments were held and the 
confines of the agreement were not broken. 
The following discussion is closely linked to the above discussion of the 
intifada, because as already mentioned, the intifada was presented as a form of 
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jihad. By presenting the uprising as a form of jihad one also invested it with 
religious significance, and thus contributed to the perception of the intifada as a 
religious one. This way the uprising can be said to have been Islamized. Mishal 
and Sela (2000:67) argue that the main concern of Hamas was the future of jihad. 
Before elaborating on this it is necessary to clarify the meaning of the concept 
itself. The word means endeavor. It is often used as an equivalent to holy war, and 
although it often means this, it also connotes other meanings such as struggle and 
effort. On the one hand jihad designates a general struggle against Israel and as 
such one can see the intifada as a jihad. On the other hand jihad denotes armed, 
violent struggle. The word is primarily used by Hamas to describe a defensive war 
against a Zionist aggressor, but it is also used to describe struggles on a non 
physical level, such as writing and education (Nüsse, 1998: 70), support and 
solidarity, elements which are all included in Hamas’s description of jihad in 
article 30 of the Charter.  
During the very first months of the intifada Hamas was still a fragile 
movement not sure to survive for a long time. With the prospects of losing its 
limited support and become a loser on the Palestinian political arena, Hamas 
leaders therefore advised their followers only to undertake actions with religious 
overtones. Another concern of the Hamas leaders, especially Sheik Yassin, was 
that violent actions would be retaliated against Hamas’s social institutions 
(Mishal; Sela, 2000:56, 57) which secure much of Hamas’s popular support. The 
consequence of this policy of only undertaking religious actions was that the 
movement, to a large extent, was perceived as a religious group. This could also 
account for the relatively tolerant Israeli attitude, mentioned earlier, towards 
Hamas during the first year of the intifada. Although jihad is mentioned in the 
Charter from 1988 it was not until after the Temple Mount Massacre in October 
1990, where 17 Palestinians were killed by Israeli police, that Hamas for real 
launched its strategy against the Zionist enemy into action. Following this was a 
sharp rise in knife attacks against Israelis, something which Hamas interpreted as 
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an evidence of Islamic devotion (ibid, 57). During the three first years of the 
intifada Hamas had still not engaged in much military and violent activity. 
According to Mishal and Sela the number of military operations during Hamas’s 
first year amounted to ten, the number rising sharply to 32 its second year (ibid.). 
These operations included shooting and knife attacks at Israeli civilians and 
military transportations, kidnapping and murder. When Hamas then in 1990 
launched a holy war this was due to that it was a necessary move in order not to 
lag behind other Palestinian groups in the fight against Israel. It provided Hamas 
with an opportunity to catch up with the leading position the Palestinian nationalist 
organizations had achieved during their long time existence, because “(…) [the 
message of holy war] had the effect of substantiating the meaning of jihad and 
investing it with a specific immediate significance” (ibid.) in forms of violent 
actions against Israeli targets. After the deportation of the Islamists to Lebanon in 
1992 Hamas’s use of car bombs increased (ibid, 67), and after their return to the 
Occupied Territories, Hamas carried out its first suicide operation. This constituted 
a dramatic turn in how jihad was fought and jihad now to a greater extent than 
before became equated with armed struggle.  
According to article 12 of the Hamas Charter jihad is an individual duty for 
every Muslim, regardless of gender or social status. This is considered an 
unquestionable truth, it says in the Charter. One may wonder, however, how 
unquestionable this truth is, because according to Nüsse (1998:72) the 
understanding of jihad as an individual, rather than a collective obligation, is 
contradictory to Sunni mainstream thought. She argues that Hamas’s interpretation 
of jihad is legitimized by only peripheral and exceptional regulations in the Quran 
and in classical fiqh. One such regulation which deals with jihad is Surah 9:5, 
Repentance, which states:  
And when the forbidden months have passed, kill the idolaters wherever you find 
them and take them prisoners, and beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them at 
every place of ambush. But if they repent and observe Prayer and pay the Zakat, 
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then leave their way free. Surely Allah is Most Forgiving, Merciful (Holy Quran, 
1979). 
Even if Hamas do not define Jews as idolaters, they do refer to them as infidels. 
Regular praying and paying Zakat, i.e., alms or charity, are two of the pillars of 
Islam. Thus it can seem from the Surah that only in the case of the idolaters 
embracing Islam may a true Hamas follower end the attacks. This Surah then 
seems to confirm Hamas’s perception that the jihad against Israel is a legitimate 
one. The exceptions to the view upon jihad as a collective obligation one finds in 
the Kharijites interpretation of jihad and in classical fiqh, Islamic jurisprudence, 
where jihad becomes a personal duty in the case of hostile aggression against 
Islamic territory (Nüsse, 1998:72). Then it may be considered a form of self-
defense. Nome points to that this is how many Palestinians see Hamas’s jihad 
(2002:16, 187). She argues that jihad is appealing as they regard it as a legitimate 
tactic of self-defense against Israeli force. For this view they can find support in 
Surah 2:191: “And fight in the cause of Allah against those who fight against you, 
but do not transgress. Surely, Allah loves not the transgressors”. Her observation 
is also underpinned by Hamas’s own statements about jihad. The movement has 
been careful to present it as self-defense from Israeli force or as vengeance for 
Israeli offences (Mishal; Sela, 2000:66). To underpin this Hamas in the formerly 
mentioned memorandum to the Sharm al-Sheik delegates (Hroub, 2002:310) 
points to a statement Rabin did in 1988 while being Defense Minister in Israel: 
“To achieve our objective, we do not wait for violence from the other side, but 
rather stage incidents to teach those who engage in violence a lesson. In most 
cases, confrontations were at the initiative [of the army]”. By claiming self-
defense Hamas has been able to attain legitimacy time after time from the 
Palestinian public and at the same time disclaimed the responsibility for why it 
happened. In cases where it was not possible to claim self-defense or when the 
revenge was not consistent with the Israeli offense, then religious devotion was a 
frequently used excuse as well as the argument that it was necessary to stop the 
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growing Judaization of Palestine, which can be seen as self-defense in a broader 
sense. The legitimacy of jihad concerns in particular the use of suicide bombs to 
kill civilians, as these are a common manifestation of jihad. A wave of suicide 
bombs in the spring of 1996 attracted great interest and condemnation from the 
whole world, including from Muslim countries. This started a public debate on 
legitimate ways to fight Israel. Muslim scholars and theologians participated and 
issued fatwas condemning the suicide bombs as acts of individual suicide 
unworthy of martyrdom (ibid, 76). A commonly used reply to this by Islamist 
movements is that whoever utters a negative word about suicide bombings is 
serving Israel. In Hamas’s opinion such debates are initiated by the enemy state, 
i.e., by Israel (Nome, 2002:190, 191).  
So would Hamas’s raison d’être disappear if Hamas obeyed the DOP’s 
military restrictions, i.e., to abstain from using jihad? Was the movement based on 
its doctrine of jihad to such a degree that it would cease to exist without it? Here 
we can envisage the same scenarios that were discussed in the discussion about 
Hamas’s future in case of the intifada ending: In case of Hamas abandoning its 
commitment to continue the armed struggle, this would constitute a violation of 
own beliefs and dogma as well as presenting the movement with the prospect of 
losing supporters. Abandoning jihad would mean jeopardizing Hamas’s status as 
the leading movement for the liberation of Palestine and it could be interpreted as 
an acceptance of the Oslo agreement. Hamas could lose supporters and be accused 
of being traitors if it accepted to refrain from armed struggle. If the movement 
continued to vow jihad it risked alienating the Palestinians in favor of the peace 
process. If military operations, i.e., acts of jihad, were upheld in spite of the 
people’s willingness to give the peace agreement a chance, then Hamas would not 
only face losing popular goodwill but it would also face severe confrontations and 
very difficult relationships with the PNA, which was responsible for the 
implementation, and with the PLO.  
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One way or another it would be problematic for Hamas to continue relying 
on jihad because the agreement did have great influence on Hamas’s freedom of 
action. However, it would be an exaggeration, in this concern, to say that the 
agreement did pose an existential threat to the movement. The military restrictions 
put down by the agreement did not represent a danger in that Hamas would 
completely cease to exist if it could not employ jihad. This must be seen in light of 
the massive support Hamas enjoyed through its civilian wing. On the one hand 
Hamas is a relatively young movement with jihad against Israel as its main task. If 
one sees this as the decisive factor in defining the movement, then Mishal’s and 
Sela’s assumption about Hamas’s ceasing to exist if the jihad ends, could be 
correct. However, on the other hand, Hamas can be said to be an old movement 
because it is a wing of the Muslim Brotherhood. During decades it built up a great 
popular base of support through its extensive community services and the support 
increased in spite of lack of involvement in the national struggle. As mentioned, 
around 90 percent of Hamas’s activities evolve around community services and 
this constitutes the basis of Hamas’s popular support. The importance of the 
civilian wing should not be underestimated because Hamas would be able to 
survive through the support generated by this wing. Besides, if it were to be the 
case that Hamas would cease to exist without its jihad, the movement would have 
had to be far less pragmatic. This will be discussed in the following.  
 
5.2.1. Pragmatism. 
With the concerns from above in mind, after the signing of the Oslo agreement, 
Hamas had to make a decision about whether to continue its jihad or not. The 
decision fell on a continuation of the struggle and it was in fact escalated in the 
first months after the signing (Mishal; Sela, 2000:67). It was “(...) perceived as the 
ultimate source of legitimacy and as a shield against any attempt by the [PNA] to 
restrict the movement’s activities or eliminate them altogether” (ibid.). However, 
at the same time some of the leaders of Hamas adopted a more moderate 
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orientation as they seemed to recognize the Oslo agreement as irreversible. From 
the discussion on the previous pages we see that Hamas had to take the 
Palestinians and their opinions into consideration as well as the movements own 
practical concerns about will and ability to survive. Hamas recognized its own 
limits of power and because the movement needed to compete for support with the 
PNA it adopted a more flexible attitude towards Israel (ibid, 21). It thus 
subordinated jihad to political cost-benefit calculations (ibid, 50). It did by no 
means abandon the jihad doctrine, but Hamas activists were more hesitant than 
before to translate it into action (ibid, 60). This policy opened for considerable 
pragmatism. One suggestion, resulting from this pragmatic opening concerned the 
possibility of a truce, a hudna, with Israel. It was raised in November 1993 in an 
open letter written by Sheikh Yassin who had been imprisoned since May 1989. 
Conditions attached to this were that Israel had to withdraw from the Occupied 
Territories, the Israeli settlements had to be dismantled and Palestinian prisoners 
released.  
  For Hamas the jihad constituted a “(...) campaign over existence and 
destiny” (ibid, 59). In the Charter various articles stress the necessity of jihad and 
emphasize this as the only way of liberating Palestine15. Is this offer of a hudna 
then not inconsistent and contradictory to Hamas’s all-encompassing call for 
jihad, as stated by Hamas both in the Charter and in political appeals? The answer 
to the question is no. A hudna is consistent with Hamas’s faith because it is only a 
temporary truce. The rationale behind Yassin’s offer was that as Hamas was well 
aware of the discrepancy between the small territory of the agreement and the 
territory wished for by Hamas it would be wise to settle for less as long as it was 
absolutely clear that it was temporary and would eventually lead to an independent 
state. The truce is only a stage in the process leading to an inevitable final battle 
where, according to Hamas’s view, the Muslims will be the winning part (Charter, 
article 7). 
                                                 
15 E.g., articles 12, 13 and 15. 
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Yassin’s offer exemplifies Hamas’s ability to be pragmatic and 
ideologically flexible. The opportunity to resort to hudna makes it less threatening 
to give up jihad, because the struggle is not given up on a permanent basis and 
Hamas can still claim to be acting in line with Islamic faith and with its decisions 
rooted in religion. Putting the holy war on hold can be justified by the concept of 
sabr which means patience or restraints; in the end the believers will prevail, but 
patience is a precondition. The concept is used as a pragmatic justification of the 
deviation from Islamic norms (Mishal; Sela, 2000: 64). 
Another source of support and legitimacy for Yassin’s offer Hamas finds in 
Hadith, Islamic tradition, according to which the Prophet Muhammad in the year 
628 declared a truce with the pagan chiefs of Mecca. According to Uri Avnery 
(2003), an Israeli journalist and peace activist, the most common Israeli 
interpretation of this Hadith is that Muhammad broke the truce and conquered 
Mecca. An implication of this is that the Israelis find the Arabs untrustworthy 
when they offer a hudna (ibid.) and that it makes them less willing to accept or 
commit to truces offered by Hamas. An acceptance is problematic because of fear 
that Hamas will break it, just as the Prophet did. On the topic of hudna Yassin 
states in an interview with Graham Usher (2003) that “[in] all cases our [Hamas’s] 
stance will be determined by what serves the interests of the Palestinian people. If 
it is in the interest of the Palestinian people to have a hudna, we’ll have a hudna. If 
it isn’t we won’t”. According to this a truce can be broken if it is the will of the 
people, but one may also see it as an example of Hamas being pragmatic and not 
wanting to commit itself genuinely to a truce that may prove not to be favorable to 
the movement? Because it is temporary it is also implied that it will in fact end 
some day and it can be broken. By resorting to hudna in order to adapt to the 
current political situation Hamas then, in a way, is safeguarding its own actions: if 
it proves not to be beneficial it can be broken, otherwise it may be upheld for a 
long time something which then may be interpreted as a de facto recognition of 
Israel. In either way Hamas avoids compromising its beliefs as hudna does have 
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religious legitimacy. Hamas can use it as a way of maintaining its support with the 
Palestinian public in that they cannot be accused of having abandoned its stance, 
the activists will not be seen as spoilers of the peace agreement and they can resort 
to jihad again once the hudna proves unfavorable. Yassin’s offer was rejected by 
Israel. Because Hamas had the opportunity to resort to hudna and thereby put the 
holy war on hold, the DOP was, in my opinion, not a complete death sentence for 
the movement when it comes to military restrictions. The greatest danger of the 
military restrictions, i.e., that Hamas can no longer use jihad, is on the one hand 
that Hamas risked losing support and be accused of treason if it accepted the 
restrictions. On the other hand, if the military restrictions were ignored it would 
lead to confrontations with the PLO and PNA, something which will be further 
discussed in the following part.  
 
5.3. The Question of Palestinian Representation and Relations with the PNA. 
Moving to the third reason why the Oslo agreement was a threat to Hamas’s 
existence, Mishal and Sela (2000) believe it led to competition with the PLO and 
with the PNA which replaced the Israeli occupation forces.  
One aspect in this regard concerned the question of who was entitled to 
legitimately represent the Palestinian people. With the agreement came 
recognition of the PLO as Israel’s negotiation partner. This implied recognition of 
the PLO as legitimate representatives of the Palestinians, which as mentioned was 
the only right conceded to the Palestinians according to Dajani (1994:8). This was 
by no means unproblematic. Hamas had never unconditionally accepted this 
assertion before. The movement’s recognition of the PLO as the representatives of 
the Palestinian people was, as mentioned, conditional upon the PLO not 
recognizing Israel and not abandoning the liberation struggle. Now the issue of 
legitimacy had gained momentum as Hamas seemed to voice the opinion of the 
many Palestinians who shared the movement’s opinion and did not approve of the 
PLO’s decision to accept the DOP. Hamas spokesmen proclaimed the need for a 
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new leadership because “the Palestinian people (…) had become leaderless (…)” 
(Hroub, 2002:99).  This issue was of special importance to Hamas as it was the 
only group strong and big enough to challenge the status of the PLO. In spite of 
the movement’s wide support, the total exclusion from the process was proof of 
that Hamas was not recognized as a potential negotiation partner neither by the 
international community, by Israel nor by the PLO. However, Hamas chose not to 
challenge the status of the PLO to large extents (ibid, 101) and the movement thus 
apparently stuck to its emphasis on keeping the unity of Palestinian ranks and its 
indirect assertion that it did not aspire to replace anyone (Charter, article 25). The 
PLO, nevertheless, was well aware of the danger Hamas represented and 
according to Cleveland (1999:487) one reason why the PLO decided to embark on 
negotiations with Israel in the first place was its fear of being overrun by Hamas 
and so the PLO hoped to regain importance by participating in the negotiations. 
According to Hamas, Arafat was pursuing personal interests and he was accused 
of having signed the accords because he wanted international recognition, 
especially from the USA (Nüsse, 1998:150). Hamas rejected the right of the PLO 
to act as representatives of the Palestinians, something which is illustrated by one 
of Hamas’s founders, Abdul Aziz al-Rantisi’s statement in September 1993:  
(…) If the PLO claimed that it represented the Palestinian people when it was 
pursuing the liberation of Palestine, then with what right can it claim it represents 
the Palestinian people now that it has recognized Israel and given all of Palestine 
to it? (al-Rantisi quoted from Hroub, 2002:99).  
 
Hamas accused the PLO of having abandoned Palestinian fundamentals (ibid, 91) 
and as the movement refused to see the PLO as legitimate representatives of the 
Palestinians neither could they accept any agreement made by them. Arafat’s 
signature and his recognition of Israel were in a communiqué issued by the Hamas 
leadership in Amman condemned as treason against the Palestinian people and the 
Islamic nation (Kurz; Tal, 1997: chapter 3).  
The PNA, dominated by the PLO (Mishal; Sela, 2000:103) and established 
by the Cairo agreement, in Gaza and Jericho in May 1994, was the organ 
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responsible for the implementation of the agreement. It had to see to that it was 
undertaken as smoothly as possible and that the agreement was not in any way 
broken. This was conditional upon the PNA’s and its police force’s ability to keep 
Hamas and other opponents under tight control. There was much at stake for the 
PNA, and especially for Arafat, because Israel had made it clear that Arafat would 
prove himself to be an unreliable partner in the peace process if he failed to 
control the Hamas militants (Cleveland, 1999:493). 
Competition with the PNA constituted a threat because it gave Hamas a 
subordinated position in relation to PNA, and thus to the PLO, on the Palestinian 
political arena. In spite of it being the second largest faction on the political arena, 
after Fatah (Abu-Amr, 1993:15), if the movement decided not to accept the 
position it could run the risk of being completely defeated because compared to 
the PNA and PLO it was the weaker part. The two would most probably be the 
prevailing part in future confrontations and depending on the graveness of the 
confrontations Hamas could face the danger of disappearing as a political actor or 
even ceasing to exist as an organization. If it accepted the “assigned” position it 
would mean, if not peaceful coexistence, then at least some degree of cooperation 
with the PNA. This was problematic because an acceptance of the PNA implied an 
acceptance of the agreement and of its designers who were seen as traitors. Even 
more seriously it also implied recognition of Israel. This would be a way in which 
Hamas faced losing support and thus become more marginalized. The movement 
was afraid to compromise its ideology by abandoning stands and beliefs and 
succumbing to commitments made by the designers of the DOP. At the same time, 
however, challenging the PNA instead of giving in to their demands of refraining 
from violence, would also mean a kind of marginalization because, as mentioned, 
the agreement enjoyed great support both from the Palestinians, from Israel, 
regionally and from the international community.  
According to Hroub (2002:103, 104) the approaches Hamas employed in 
dealing with the PNA were very varied. In his letter to Rabin, Arafat commits to 
 65
disciplining violators of the agreement (Arafat in Abbas, 1995:238). This would 
be the responsibility of the PNA so it was important for Hamas to establish good 
relations with the organ when it first came to existence. Thus in the beginning 
there were tactical attempts of close cooperation to establish goodwill and later 
both verbal toughness as well as official contact. However, it turned out that 
peaceful coexistence with the PNA was a price Hamas was not prepared to pay for 
giving up its jihad because the movement would not risk losing popular support. 
“Without the legitimating shield of jihad, Hamas would be exposed to a process of 
containment that could eventually destroy it as a political power” (Mishal; Sela, 
2000:68). When Hamas decided it would continue its jihad, it thus signed up for 
confrontations with the PNA, and it was now facing two enemies, the PNA and 
Israel, instead of just one. The situation was very difficult. The PNA pursued a 
unilateral strategy against Hamas to cause a near-civil war (Hroub, 2002:104). 
This was a way to undermine Hamas’s power and the PNA initiated arrests, 
closures of institutions and humiliations of Hamas leaders. In order to maintain its 
popularity with the Palestinian public and generate public resistance to the 
agreement, Hamas once again showed its pragmatic side. It pursued a strategy 
which combined continued violence against Israel with massive anti-Oslo 
propaganda and an avoidance of violent confrontations with the PNA (Mishal; 
Sela, 2000:68). The rationale behind this was that Israel, no matter what, was an 
occupying power so the struggle would continue against it. If the PNA retaliated 
against Hamas, Hamas would look upon this as a consequence of the agreement 
and would remain passive towards the PNA and instead avenge it onto Israel 
(Jensen, 2002:46). This way Hamas hoped to maintain its support, maintain unity 
in the Palestinian ranks and avoid civil war as well as not giving the PNA a pretext 
to abolish Hamas as a military movement.  
The relationship between Hamas and the PNA, and thus the PLO must been 
seen in light of the dynamics of the conflict between Israel and Hamas. After the 
Hebron massacre of February 25, 1994, in which 29 Muslim civilians were killed 
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by a Jewish settler, Hamas started to use suicide bombers, al-Zahar claiming it was 
a matter of retaliation, not of politics (Meidell, n.d.). Before this there had only 
been a few sporadic suicide operations, including one the day before Oslo was 
signed. The acceptance of Israeli civilians as legitimate targets also grew after this. 
Israel replied by closing off territories and placing many towns under curfew with 
the result that Palestinians were denied access to the Israeli labor markets. This 
had a deteriorating effect foremost in economical terms, and the disempowerment 
many Palestinians experienced became directed towards Arafat, his PNA and the 
status quo they represented (Cleveland, 1999:494). Within the PLO corruption was 
widespread and this also contributed to the public resentment towards both the 
organization and the authority. The economic hardship made the Palestinians turn 
away from the peace process as instead of prosperity it had brought poverty to the 
Occupied Territories. As opposed to many of the PLO leaders who had been 
exiled prior to 1994 Hamas had been present during the years of the intifada and 
experienced the same situation as large segments of the Palestinian community. 
The movement was the main beneficiary of these sentiments towards the PLO-
dominated PNA (ibid, 492) and it was to larger extent than before seen as a home 
based alternative to the PLO. 
In September 1995 Hamas and the PNA reached an understanding that 
Hamas’s armed struggle could continue in areas not controlled by the PNA, as it 
was not the PNA’s responsibility to defend Israel. Hamas activists would abstain 
from embarrassing the PNA and from taking credit for their actions. In this 
manner the PNA would not be accused of neglecting its work and Hamas could 
continue its struggle and at the same time retain its credibility. That Hamas could 
cooperate with the PNA at all was due to the will and ability to be pragmatic and 
tactical that the movement possessed. Without its ideological flexibility this 
cooperation would have been impossible because the PNA worked for an 
implementation of what they believed would eventually lead to a two-state 
solution which to Hamas is impermissible and cannot be tolerated. For some 
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months a relatively peaceful period followed before it was abruptly ended by 
Mossad’s assassination of the Hamas activist Yahya Ayyash, also known as the 
“Engineer”. Hamas proclaimed self-defence and vowed revenge. It waited until 
after the election of the Palestinian Legislative Council, in which Arafat became 
the President, had been undertaken in January 1996 and then, on February 25, 
launched a new and bloody suicide wave. Succeeding the actions Arafat was under 
high pressure to destroy Hamas, as well as Islamic Jihad, once and for all. While 
Israel upheld its closure of the Occupied Territories (Kristianasen, 1999:29) more 
than a thousand Islamists were arrested, the PNA assumed control over mosques 
in Gaza and Hamas institutions and the Islamic University were raided. In 1997 
the PNA, partly in response to American and Israeli pressure, closed 16 of the 
movement’s central institutions in Gaza (Jensen, 2002:49). The movement’s large 
network of mosques, schools and religious organizations, in other words the 
civilian wing, constitutes Hamas’s infrastructure and secures much of the 
movement’s popular support. In this we see that the establishment of the PNA and 
Hamas’s competition with it was not only dangerous in that Hamas ran the risk of 
being marginalized and suppressed militarily and politically. A far greater risk was 
that the movement risked attacks upon its civilian wing. The PNA’s attacks upon 
the civilian wing posed a real danger as an elimination of this wing could be fatal 
to Hamas. In my opinion this represented a greater danger than the military 
restrictions did with their abolishment of jihad as a strategy in the fight. 
   Thus the Hamas-PNA understanding did not last very long. There were 
severe clashes between Hamas activists and PNA officials. Hamas, together with 
other opponents of the PNA’s rule were silenced through press censorship and 
brutal interrogations and many Palestinians found the PNA-rule to be as 
oppressive as the Israeli occupation (Cleveland, 1999:492). In 1998 Hamas, and 
the al-Qassam Brigades in particular, was weakened by the assassinations of three 
of its top military leaders; Muhiedin Sharif and the brothers Imad and Adil 
Awadallah as well as by the imprisonment of Abdul Aziz al-Rantisi (Kristianasen, 
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1999:32). There were suspicions of PNA participation in the assassinations, 
something which further deteriorated the relationship between Hamas and the 
authority. The hope of establishing good relations with the PNA seemed to end 
definitively with the signing of the Wye accord in October 1998 as this accord 
repeated that Israeli redeployment was contingent upon the PNA’s ability to deal 
with “terrorist groups and their infrastructure” (ibid.). Despite that the institutions 
were formally closed, they continued to exist on a smaller level underground 
(Jensen, 2002:53) and Hamas was “permitted” to live on. The municipal and local 
elections of May and September 2005 can serve as proof that the movement’s 
popular base of support did not disappear with the attacks upon the civilian wing.  
The establishment of the PNA also represented a danger because it 
accentuated the differences concerning strategy between Hamas’s outside and 
inside leadership, and thereby making the movement weaker. The growing 
influence of the PNA in Palestinian society challenged the control the outside 
leadership had in these areas. The internal discord was manifest in the varied 
views upon suicide bombing as a strategy, as the leadership in Amman was more 
willing to pursue it than the leadership in the Occupied Territories, who after all, 
were the ones to feel the PNA’s punitive measures first hand. It was the inside 
leadership which had to live with the hardship of the situation on a daily basis. The 
differences were also salient regarding the question from the PNA of whether 
Hamas should become an Islamic political party to participate in the elections for 
the Palestinian Legislative Council (Kurz; Tal, 1997: chapter 3). This was 
perceived as highly problematic because participation would imply an acceptance 
of the negotiations, i.e., of the peace process, which was the reason why elections 
were scheduled to be held, and it also contradicted Hamas’s Charter (article 13). 
Hamas delegates from the Occupied Territories were much more inclined to agree 
with the proposal than the delegates from abroad. The movement did not 
participate. 
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5.4. Summary. 
So why was the agreement seen as a threat to Hamas’s existence? Well, first the 
DOP put an end to the intifada, which by some was believed to be Hamas’s raison 
d’être. Second, it made jihad as a strategy to achieve a free Palestine illegal, 
including the use of jihad as self-defense. Third, it put Hamas in danger by 
presenting the movement with the dilemma of either following its dogma or 
accepting Israel. Hamas thus faced losing supporters. Fourth, it increased the risk 
of marginalization of Hamas, both if Hamas chose to fight the PLO, the PNA and 
the agreement and if it did not, in the latter case it may be marginalized because it 
would be subordinated to the other groups as they were more powerful. So the 
Oslo agreement did in fact pose a threat to Hamas in terms of its relation to the 
PNA. There were serious confrontations between the two groups and several 
arrests of Hamas leaders and activists. This constituted a marginalization of the 
movement, so the threat can be said to have represented far more than just 
competition. The agreement also recognized Palestinian representatives who 
according to Hamas turned the steering wheel away from the objective of a free 
Palestine because they endorsed what they perceived to be a two-state solution 
which was rejected by Hamas. Finally, Hamas risked losing also its social 
institutions, through which many of the movement’s activist were recruited, if it 
did not abide by the PNA’s ruling. These were the tactical reasons of opposition. 
But Hamas through its pragmatic ways of adjusting to the political situation, 
through its tactical ways of operating and because of the solid base of support in 
the civilian wing managed not only to survive but also to fight the agreement with 
the effect that it eventually died, something for which Hamas can be partly 
credited or blamed, depending on one’s view.  
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6. Religious Reasons of Opposition. 
In looking at Hamas’s possible religious objections to the DOP one must bear in 
mind what the agreement signified in relation to Hamas’s beliefs and in relation 
with the movement’s desire for an Islamic state. What factors discussed in the 
Charter can account for Hamas’s religious opposition to Oslo? In which ways can 
the opposition be said to be motivated in religion? In the following I will discuss a 
number of elements to provide an answer to this. 
 
6.1. Religion and Nationalism.  
Did Hamas object to the agreement on religious terms? Were the arguments 
Hamas used to demonstrate the movement’s objections to the agreement based on 
religion? By viewing and interpreting the movement’s Charter it can certainly be 
said to be that way.  
The Charter is a religious document in the way that it is the constitution of 
a religious movement. It is filled with religious references as well as obligations 
and guidelines. That Hamas bases some objections in religion is evident already in 
the very first articles, in which Hamas states that Islam guides all of Hamas’s 
actions, thinking and beliefs 16(article 1). It is also consistent with traditional 
Islamic belief that divine authority is required for all human actions (Eid, n.d). 
Islam’s all-encompassing guiding role is further emphasized with discussions of 
different aspects of life such as politics, economics, education and arts (Charter, 
article 2). That means religion is also the foundation for the movement’s stands in 
political matters such as peace processes something that is specified in article 13, 
which deals explicitly with Hamas’s view upon peace agreements: “[Peace] 
initiatives, the so-called peaceful solutions, and the international conferences to 
resolve the Palestinian problem, are all contrary to the beliefs of the Islamic 
Resistance Movement”. The same day as the Charter was published, August 18, 
                                                 
16 My emphasis. 
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1988, Hamas also issued a leaflet which can further explain the article above. It 
states: “Every negotiation with the enemy is a regression from the [Palestinian] 
cause, concession of a principle, and recognition of the usurping murderers’ false 
claim to a land in which they were not born” (Hamas in Mishal; Sela, 2000:51). 
The movement dismisses all peace initiatives as a waste of time and as an effort of 
unjust infidels to rule the holy land of Islam, that is, Palestine. Here it is 
appropriate to make a little comment that may nuance the view of negotiations as 
expressed in the Charter. Years after the signing al-Zahar stated on the issue of 
peace negotiations that Hamas were not opposed to negotiations with Israel per se, 
but they objected if the Palestinian bargaining position was unfavorable and when 
Hamas believed they would not receive any concessions from the Israelis (al-
Zahar in Gaess, 2002). This is an illustration of the discrepancy between the 
Charter and some of the Hamas members’ more pragmatically oriented positions.  
The view expressed in the Charter is further elaborated in the next part of 
article 13, which reads that “(…) renouncing part of Palestine means renouncing 
part of the religion; the nationalism of the Islamic Resistance Movement is part of 
its faith (…)”. The importance that nationalism carries for Hamas is very 
important to have in mind here. As already discussed in Chapter 2, to Hamas, 
nationalism and Islam are inseparable. Hamas sees Palestine as an Islamic trust, a 
waqf, land given to the Muslims to inherit from generation to generation until 
Resurrection Day (article 11). However, Palestine is not holy only to the Muslims. 
It holds holy places to them such as the Dome of Rock and the Al-Aqsa Mosque 
which was where the Prophet ascended to heaven according to Islam. In addition 
Jerusalem was the first Qibla, that is, direction of prayer (Wasserstein, 2001) and 
it was the place where the Prophet received the second pillar of Islam, the prayer. 
The Dome of Rock and the Al-Aqsa mosque is both situated on Al-Haram ash-
Sharif, known to the Jews as the Temple Mount. This place holds religious 
significance and sacredness for them with its Wailing Wall being a center of 
pilgrimage. For Christians Palestine is the land where Jesus was born, lived and 
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died, and Jerusalem in particular has many holy places. The sanctity of these 
religious places has extended to Palestine as a whole (Litvak, 1996)17. We see that 
Palestine has religious significance to all groups.  
In Hamas’s view the Palestinians, by the virtue of being Muslims, have the 
right to populate and live in the land. Because they hold the land sacred it belongs 
to them. It is impossible for people of one generation to give it up, because it is not 
theirs to give. The argument that Palestine belongs to the Muslims because they 
are Muslims, is consistent with Hamas’s view of nationalism and religion as 
inseparable, something which in some cases can be extended to be valid for 
religion and politics more generally too. That nationalism is integral to Hamas’s 
Islamic faith carries deep implications for the liberation struggle. The territorial 
objectives of Hamas cannot be abandoned by a faithful Hamas Islamist without 
this person at the same time giving up his or hers beliefs. This accounts for one of 
the religion based arguments against the DOP and is illustrated in the second 
excerpt from article 13 above. By emphasizing this point in the Charter Hamas 
strengthens its own position, because abandoning territorial objectives may seem a 
very high price to pay if it also means abandoning religious beliefs. An appropriate 
remark in this regard is whether religion really is forming Hamas’s political views, 
as in accordance with the Charter, or if Hamas dresses its political claims and 
arguments in religious rhetoric and thus make them appear as religious arguments. 
Cleveland (1999: 492) argues that Hamas’s main argumentation against the DOP 
was religious as the agreement contradicted the Charter and impeded the 
movement’s goal of restoring the land to Islamic rule. It is correct that the 
agreement contradicted the Charter, and from this I find it very reasonable that it 
was important to oppose on religious grounds. However, I believe it is important 
to ask oneself whether the religious arguments of opposition really are an 
expression of genuine religiosity or if religion is used to promote a point of view 
for political purposes. I believe this to be an important question because of the 
                                                 
17 See chapter named “The Sanctification of Islamic Palestine”. 
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implications of the answer. On the one hand, if it is so that the objection really is 
founded on a religious basis then it may be more difficult in negotiations to 
compromise and make concessions on the matter than if the argument had been 
grounded in politics. I find this plausible because religion constitutes a very 
important part of one’s identity. In my opinion it is more rigid and less subject to 
change than political affiliation and I see a slimmer chance of people giving up 
religious beliefs than political ideas.  
On the other hand, if religion is used to sell a political point of view, then 
one may find it easier to make concessions if one is aware of the possibility that 
what is considered an unquestionable holy claim, may have its roots in politics. 
Thus one can make a compromise on the matter without necessarily breaking with 
one’s religious beliefs and this may then imply a change of the terms of the 
negotiations. If religious rhetoric and symbolism is used instrumentally I find it 
likely that it has the effect of motivating and uniting people in the resistance 
struggle as well as strengthening the political arguments, because an argument that 
is fundamentally political may generate more support if a religious dimension is 
added to it. A factor which in my opinion makes it easier to use religion in an 
instrumental way is that the religious and the national division lines of the conflict 
correspond. Being Muslim or Christian is to a strong extent associated with being 
Palestinian and being Jewish is to a strong extent associated with being Israeli18. 
Thus both sides may use religion to promote political objectives.  
This discussion may seem to question the genuineness of Hamas’s religious 
opposition to Oslo. That is not my intention. I do not see religious and political 
arguments as mutually excluding. Even if religion is used to reinforce a political 
argument and enhance the support from other believers, one should not rule out 
that for a devoted believer religion really is the basis for the political views and 
has a value of its own. This can be seen in light of the view of Hamas as part of a 
                                                 
18 Approximately 5% of the Palestinians are Christians (Nüsse, 1998:102) and about 20%, approximately 
one million people, of the Israeli population is not Jewish. Three-quarters of this group are Sunni-Muslims 
with the second largest group being Christians (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001) 
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two-faceted phenomenon. On the one hand it is a national-political movement in 
the way that it fights for a free Palestine and for the rights of the Palestinian 
people. On the other hand it is part of an upsurge of Islamism. In the whole region 
of the Middle East there has been a growth of Islamism partly as a response to 
popular demands for change. It now is an important ideology in many states. The 
Islamists are deeply religious people who have a strong conviction about the 
necessity of making a more religious society. As Hamas then both is a national-
political and a religious movement I find it only natural that they think about 
politics and argue their political views in religious terms. The answer to my 
question above then is that Hamas’s religious arguments may be an expression of 
genuine religiosity and at the same time used to strengthen the political opposition.  
The explicit link between religion and nationalism, or religion and politics 
more generally, serves Hamas’s cause and is by no means harmful to the 
movement. Hamas may well use the link to attract more supporters and to 
capitalize on its aim of establishing a free, Islamic Palestine in the whole area of 
mandatory Palestine. It is reasonable to believe that by presenting nationalism and 
religion as so strongly related and interconnected Hamas has managed to influence 
the way in which people perceive peace processes because, as mentioned, it may 
be harder for people to accept compromises if it means abandoning religious 
beliefs. In my view the will and the ability to compromise is essential when 
working towards a peace agreement. It seems unlikely that anything can be 
achieved if the parties are unwilling to do so and to make concessions. Thus the 
link can be said to be harmful to the peace process as the view advocated by the 
movement leaves little room for compromises. 
Because Palestine is considered a holy waqf it also means that it cannot be 
divided. A Hamas leaflet of March 1988 states: “Let every hand be cut off that 
signs a relinquishment of grain of the soil of Palestine to the enemies of Allah who 
have usurped the blessed soil” (Hamas in Ahmad, 1994: chapter 3). “The enemies 
of Allah” are evidently the Jews. Hamas’s desire for a state in the area of 
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mandatory Palestine is something quite different from the small Palestinian state 
of the agreement. It follows from this that the Oslo agreement which divides the 
territory and legitimizes the rule of people seen as infidels by Hamas and thus also 
impedes the establishment of an Islamic state, is impermissible to the movement. 
It is curious though how the borders set by the British mandate powers not only 
have been accepted as the borders of Palestine, but in addition have been invested 
with holiness, so that they cannot be changed and so they encompass Palestine as a 
holy, indivisible unit. Hamas is careful to stress that Palestine was once part of the 
Islamic Ottoman Empire, and the religious legitimacy of the borders seems to stem 
from this as well as from the belief that many of Islam’s prophets were from the 
area within what was to become mandatory Palestine. The movement states that 
within the Ottoman Empire there were no clearly defined borders, but what is 
today known as Palestine was part of the Southern area of Belad al-Sham 
(HamasOnLine n.d.), i.e., presently Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Jordan.  
  Hamas’s claim to Palestine based on the belief that the land is holy to 
Muslims is the same argument that the Jews use to defend their claim to Israel. 
According to the Bible Israel was promised to Abraham as the holy land of the 
Jews (Genesis 12:1-3; 15:18-21). Thus, giving up parts constitute a violation of 
God’s law, and is for some a price too high to pay for peace. This view found 
expression in the already mentioned Hebron Massacre of 1994 and in the 
assassination of Prime Minister Rabin in November 1995. The assassination, 
performed by Yigal Amir, an Israeli student in an institute of Jewish religious 
studies, led to a suspension of negotiations. Hamas’s argument is not only used as 
a religiously motivated one against the DOP, but rather as an overall argument 
against Zionism and as a counterclaim to the Jewish claim concerning the 
legitimacy of the ownership to the land. Hamas leaders have tried to reject the 
Jewish claim to ownership by arguing that from an objective historical perspective 
the Jews inhabiting Israel today have no connection to the Children of Israel who 
used to live in Palestine (Kurz; Tal, 1997: chapter 1). Another argument used is 
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that that no where in Islamic jurisprudence could one find legitimacy for accepting 
Jewish land on Islamic soil (Mishal; Sela, 2000:109). This constitutes a reason 
why Hamas resisted the DOP and it also is a reason why the movement refused to 
see the DOP as a hudna. In the previous chapter this concept was discussed in 
relation with a possible ceasing of fighting in the aftermath of the Oslo agreement. 
Hudna may also be seen more directly in connection with the agreement; one may 
argue that the very agreement itself constituted a truce, as it was a compromise 
with Israel, or in Hamas’s view with the infidel Jews. However, Hamas insisted on 
its religious illegality and refused to regard the DOP as a truce (ibid.). 
Basing the territorial claim of Palestine upon religion implies recognition of 
the idea that religious identity should grant political rights of sovereignty. One 
may question the validity of such an idea. Does religious identity constitute a 
legitimate basis for claims to political sovereignty? From reading the Hamas 
Charter one may draw the conclusion that it does, because as mentioned Hamas 
bases parts of its claim to Palestine upon the belief that the land belongs to the 
Muslims. From reading the Balfour Declaration of 1917 one may also infer that 
the answer is yes. It states that Israel was a Jewish national home (Milton-
Edwards; Hinchcliffe, 2001:10). As such, one sees that Israel was given to the 
Jews as a religious group. The claim for a state can then be said to be legitimized 
in religion because the needs of a religious group resulted in the establishment of 
Israel. However, the legitimacy behind Hamas’s religiously based claim to 
Palestine is debatable, as is the claim of ownership based on religion from the 
Jewish side.  Bernard Wasserstein (2001), president of the Jewish historical 
society of England, doubts that belonging to a religious group should grant 
political rights of sovereignty. His discussion evolves around Jerusalem, but I 
believe it to be valid for the entire area of Palestine and Israel. He doubts that the 
claim is fundamentally based in religion. Although he does not question the 
religious importance the area holds for the different groups today, he does 
question that the religious devotion for the area is reflected in political demands of 
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sovereignty. He argues that this is a fairly new idea that emerged with Zionism in 
the 19th century, when it became a religious duty to regain Jewish sovereignty of 
Jerusalem (Wasserstein, 2001:4). According to Wasserstein then the city can be 
said to have gained religious significance based on what were really the political 
aspirations of Zionism.  
This applies also to Hamas. The religious significance of Palestine gave 
symbolic importance to the resistance struggle in that it is used to reinforce the 
weight of a territorial objective. This way Wasserstein’s analysis underpins my 
assumption that religion may be used instrumentally to strengthen a political 
claim.  
 
6.2. Jerusalem. 
To argue against the Oslo agreement on a religious basis was a strategy employed 
by Hamas as well as by other Palestinian and Israeli groups. Given the difficulty 
of compromising in religious matters, it was not very likely that one side would be 
persuaded by the other side’s arguments. Hamas was aware of this and the 
movement sees the religious arguments used by the other side as evidence of the 
improbability that Israel would make concessions. The DOP itself does not deal 
with religious matters, save for one matter of religious importance, namely the 
status of Jerusalem. What was to happen to Jerusalem was of major concern to 
both the Palestinians and the Israelis and as the issue had great potential in 
creating and maintaining conflict it was important to find a solution. Nüsse 
(1998:152) argues that this issue was the one issue where Hamas got to make use 
of their religious arguments, because the movement mainly had to object to the 
DOP in the same terms it was written, i.e., political. In addition, as the city’s status 
was of importance to most Palestinians this was one issue where Hamas could 
expect to get support from people who were normally more moderate in their 
political orientation (Ahmad, 1994: conclusion).  
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During the negotiations the parties could not agree upon Jerusalem’s status, 
thus in the DOP it was deferred to the Final Status Negotiations (article V and 
agreed minutes). There were issues concerning whether the city should it be under 
Israeli, Palestinian, joint or international jurisdiction and control and which parts 
of it that should be included in the negotiations. The Palestinians wanted the areas 
taken in the wars of 1948 and 1967 to be negotiated, while Israel saw an inclusion 
of the land taken before 1967 as questioning Israeli sovereignty (Davis, 1999). The 
city is held sacred by all three religious groups; Jews, Muslims and Christians. 
Considering that the city is “the eternal capital of the Jewish people” (Rabin 
quoted from Abbas, 1995:242) and that this is a matter of creed, Hamas argued 
that Israel would never be ready to make concessions on the issue (Nüsse, 
1998:147) and this made the DOP worthless in this regard. Hamas’s stand is 
underpinned by Rabin’s statement about the Final Status Negotiations in an 
interview in the Israeli newspaper Maariv in August 1993: “There are a number of 
basic principles about which we will have to agree. One is that Jerusalem will 
[remain] under exclusive Israeli responsibility (…)”. In a speech in the Knesset on 
September 21, 1993, he reemphasizes this and states that the “(…) entity that will 
manage the lives of the Palestinians in the territories [i.e., the PNA] has no 
authority in this regard [of Jerusalem]” (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993). 
According to this it seems reasonable to believe that Hamas had a point. An 
equally uncompromising view which underpins the importance of the city to the 
Muslims is expressed by the imam and Sharia judge Hamad Bitawi: “[we] will 
never accept for Jerusalem to be under your [Israeli] control and if the Palestinian 
people were to accept that then this problem will remain of great concern to the 
whole Islamic nation (…)” (Bitawi quoted from Ahmad, 1994: chapter 5). If it 
really was so that no concessions would be made on the issue, then why was it 
scheduled to be negotiated in the Final Status Negotiations? One reason may be 
that it was clear to both parties that it would be very difficult to reach an 
agreement about it and by postponing it they at least accomplished the signing of 
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the DOP. Dajani (1994:17) believes that this was a tactical step taken by the 
Israelis. He argues that by the time the parties would have reached the final talks 
the Palestinians would have already conceded so much, that the only matter 
remaining to concede would be Jerusalem. In his view the agreement was so 
unfavorable to the Palestinians that they would be forced to give up Jerusalem. A 
side effect of the postponement is that it gave both the parties time to create facts 
on the ground, i.e., to undertake measures with the aim of changing to one’s own 
favor the demographic and geographic nature of a matter, in this case of 
Jerusalem. Such measures could be the construction of new settlements, the 
moving of more people into the area and the expansion of city borders. According 
to article V of the DOP, it was illegal to take unilateral steps during the interim 
period to prepare the conditions so they would be in one’s favor at the time of the 
Final Status Negotiations. Also the UN Security Resolution 252 of 1968 makes it 
illegal to alter the landmarks of the city (UN, 1968). This was one of the explosive 
areas of the DOP that Ashrawi referred to, mentioned in Chapter 3. She was 
shocked by the lack of guarantees preventing Israel from creating facts on the 
ground and stated: “(…) we know that they [the Israelis] will exploit their power 
as occupier to the hilt and by the time you get to permanent status [negotiations] 
Israel would have permanently altered realities on the ground (Ashrawi quoted 
from Waage, 2004: 139). The danger was that Israel as the strongest part with 
control of the city would not abide by the DOP and create facts on the ground that 
would pre-empt the final outcome in the way that the facts created would 
contribute in determining e.g., which parts of the city that would be subject of 
negotiation. It turned out that Ashrawi’s fears were not unreasonable. The most 
controversial creation of facts on the ground was the construction of a large new 
settlement in Arab Jerusalem in 1997 under Likud’s Prime Minister Benyamin 
Netanyahu. It was meant to demonstrate for the Palestinians the improbability of 
achieving a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem (Cleveland, 1999:495). The 
creation of facts was also of concern to Hamas. Shanab (in Gaess, 2002) expresses 
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concerns about the Israelis continuing to expand their settlements and as seen in 
Chapter 4 Marzuq, one of Hamas’s political leaders, pointed to the DOP’s failure 
to stop the Zionist settlement policy (Nüsse, 1998:142). The movement sees the 
creation of facts as a “(…) proof of [the Israelis] disinterest in a genuine 
reconciliation (… )” (ibid, 146). Thus we see that also in this regard Hamas found 
the agreement inadequate and I believe this constituted yet another reason to reject 
it. 
 
6.3. Final Battle. 
Hamas’s resistance to the DOP must be seen in light of the movement’s belief that 
only under Muslim rule will there be peace (article 6). Under Christian or Jewish 
rule there will be fighting, torture and uprooting according to article 31, in which 
history is pointed to as proof of this. By pointing to the history of Islam Hamas 
emphasizes the religious character of the conflict. As mentioned, the Charter 
expresses Hamas’s view upon the conflict as a religious conflict, one between 
rival religions, and it must be dealt with on that basis (article 15). This point of 
view is shared by the human rights activist Bassem Eid (n.d.) who argues that an 
Islamization of the conflict has taken place. He too sees the conflict now as not so 
much about nationalism or territory, but as one between religions, mainly between 
Judaism and Islam. However, as seen earlier the views expressed in the Charter 
are not always completely consistent with that of the Hamas members. The 
absolutistic nature of some of the articles of the Charter or of some of the official 
statements may in some instances be moderated by people within the organization. 
In this regard I find it appropriate to point to that the view upon the conflict and 
the solution as a religious one, needs to be nuanced. An example is provided by 
Shanab’s statement in an interview, in which he says that the Palestinian conflict is 
a political conflict (Shanab in Gaess, 2002). Another example of moderation is 
that Shanab goes on to speak about the right of return and the 1967 borders as 
minimum requirements for a solution of the conflict. His acceptance of the 1967 
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borders represents a deviation, and a moderation from Hamas’s official statement 
that stresses the establishment of a Palestinian state within the mandatory borders.    
Hamas envisages the members of all religions living together in harmony in 
an Islamic state. Christians and Jews will have the status of being dhimmis, i.e., 
followers of the religions tolerated by law. They will have freedom to practice 
their religion and manage some internal affairs through religious offices, but they 
will have to pay a special poll tax (Cleveland, 1999:14) and not be considered 
equal to the Muslims as members of the national community. The peace will be 
the result of an unavoidable final battle between Jews and Muslims, in which the 
Muslims, for being true believers, will be the prevailing part. “The Day of 
Judgment will not come about until Muslims fight the Jews (killing the Jews) 
(…)” (Charter, article 7). The Jews, for not having accepted Muhammad as God’s 
last prophet, will lose the struggle (Nüsse, 1998:148). The Charter explains the 
existence of evil with the absence of Islam (article 9). The absence of Islam also 
accounts for the marginalized and deprived situation in which many Palestinians 
find themselves today. A frequently used argument by Hamas to explain why 
Israel has been so successful in its wars is that it is a religious state. One might 
find this argument somewhat paradoxical considering how the Jews are renounced 
as infidels by Hamas. Israel’s very existence is perceived to be a consequence of 
the Muslims having abandoned Islamic norms (Mishal; Sela, 1997)19. According 
to the movement the Arab defeat is due to the states being secular in addition to 
lacking religious devotion (Ahmad, 1994: chapter 2). Thus also here the 
connection between religion and nationalism is evident as we see that territoriality 
has a religious aspect to it; the Palestinians’ loss of territory is a consequence of 
the absence of Islam from the realities of life.  
The opening of the Charter states in the words of Hasan al-Banna that 
“Israel will rise and will remain erect until Islam eliminates it as it had eliminated 
its predecessors”. For Hamas the battle between Muslims and Jews constitute a 
                                                 
19 See chapter named “Roots and Perceptions”. 
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historical law. It is bound to happen, but this also necessitates the Muslims 
engaging in action and taking responsibility to make it take place and in this way 
bring the subsequent peace about. Israel as a Jewish state has to be eliminated and 
it must be done through jihad. The many numbers of articles that stress jihad in 
the Charter bear proof of the significance it holds to Hamas. As a Muslim one has 
an obligation to wage jihad until Palestine is free (Charter, article 15), i.e., 
independent and Islamic. According to Hamas, by giving up the fight permanently 
one also renounces religious faith. Hamas sees itself in a leading position in the 
fight against world Zionism (Kurz; Tal, 1997: chapter 1). The spirit of jihad must 
be spread among the Muslims and the only solution to the Palestinian problem is 
by waging holy war against the Jews; “(…) we have no escape from raising the 
banner of Jihad” (Charter, article 15). That the Muslims will prevail in the 
unavoidable final battle makes Israel limited in time. The Oslo agreement thus 
only constitutes a delay, on the road towards a free Palestine, because it tried to 
prevent the battle from taking place. It was not a complete stop. A precondition for 
the final obliteration of Israel is that society is sufficiently Islamized. The DOP 
does not make provisions for an Islamization of society nor for an Islamic state. 
On the contrary it legitimizes the state of Israel which is Jewish, and in Rabin’s 
letter to Arafat (Rabin in Abbas, 1995:239) the PLO, which is a secular 
organization, is recognized as the legitimate representatives of the Palestinian 
people. As mentioned, the Hamas Charter states that secular thought is opposed to 
religious thought (article 27). The movement cannot accept secular rulers because 
they have departed from God and God’s law.    
 
6.4. Summary. 
Then returning to the questions from the beginning of the chapter, what factors 
discussed in the Charter can account for Hamas’s religious opposition to Oslo and 
in which ways can the opposition be said to be motivated in religion? It was 
important to object to the agreement because it represented a breach with several 
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of Hamas’s religious doctrines, and it had a great impact on the movement’s aim 
of establishing an Islamic state. From the discussion it is clear that some of the 
opposition to the agreement was religiously motivated; according to the Charter, 
for a devoted Hamas supporter abandoning territorial objectives meant abandoning 
religious beliefs. Thus an acceptance of the DOP implied giving up Islam. Not 
objecting to the agreement would constitute a treason against own beliefs and 
more importantly against God. The DOP renounced parts of Palestine and this way 
divided the holy land and gave it to infidels. It did not plan for an establishment of 
an Islamic state and was considered both worthless and unjust in the matter of 
Jerusalem, because Hamas believed Israel would never make concessions on the 
matter and the agreement would eventually lead to the Palestinian surrender of the 
city. Israel was believed to break with the DOP and create facts on the ground, 
something which would enhance the danger of the Palestinians having to give up 
the land. In addition the DOP contradicted the historical law of the unavoidable 
final battle which is absolutely necessary because only when the Muslims have 
prevailed and a complete Islamization has taken place, can there be peace. The 
DOP also laid the foundations for a secular state or at least it enhanced the danger, 
in Hamas view, of consolidating secularism in Palestine because the PLO was 
given control and rights of representation.  
All these religious factors must nevertheless be seen in connection with 
other elements such as nationalism, politics and identity.  
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7. Conclusion. 
In this thesis I have discussed Hamas’s various reasons to oppose the Oslo 
agreement. This has been done through exploring through discussion how the 
agreement contradicted the ideology of Hamas, how it affected the movement’s 
objective of achieving a free, Islamic Palestine and how the agreement influenced 
Hamas’s way of achieving this through jihad. In Chapter 4 I discussed Hamas’s 
political reasons of opposition and I found that the movement objected because of 
the DOP was almost silent on issues seen as vital for the Palestinians. It nearly 
ignored the question of the refugees and it lacked adequate provisions for the 
establishment of a Palestinian state and of Palestinian sovereignty. It did not stop 
the construction of settlements and was seen to legitimize the continuance and 
consolidation of the Israeli occupation, and it failed in planning a sustainable, 
profitable economy. Providing a solution to these factors is a prerequisite for the 
creation of a free Palestine. In addition, Hamas used the fact that the agreement 
was inconsistent with UN resolutions as a reason to oppose. 
In Chapter 5 the tactical reasons of opposition were discussed. The tactical 
resistance was due to that the DOP put an end to the intifada and threatened to 
stop the movement’s jihad. As Hamas came to existence with the intifada some 
believed Hamas’s survival depended upon the continuation of the uprising. There 
was a risk of Hamas losing its status as a mass organization if the intifada ended. 
To achieve a free, Islamic Palestine Hamas to a large extent employed armed 
jihad. The agreement put down military restrictions and made the jihad illegal and 
its performers became liable to penalties. Thus Hamas was faced with a dilemma 
of either ending the armed struggle and this way abandoning its beliefs as 
expressed in the Charter or continuing the armed struggle and at the same time 
risking alienating the Palestinians in favor of the agreement and face 
confrontations with the PNA. In either case Hamas faced marginalization on the 
political arena. A helping factor for Hamas in this dilemma was that the movement 
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had the opportunity to resort to hudna, something which would put the holy war 
on hold and help Hamas escape criticism of breaking with own religious beliefs, as 
the hudna does have religious legitimacy. A similar dilemma was found in the 
DOP’s subordination of Hamas to the PLO-led PNA. Both an acceptance of the 
ruling by the PNA and a rejection was problematic. An acceptance implied 
recognition of the agreement and abandonment of own ideas. It also meant 
recognition of the PLO as the legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people. 
Not accepting meant putting itself at risk of severe confrontations and at worst a 
possible elimination by opposing the PNA, the PLO, Israel and the international 
community. Now in hindsight we know that Hamas survived. However at the 
time, the threat that the DOP could stop the movement’s use of jihad as a way to 
achieve a free Palestine was perceived as so severe that it was important to oppose 
on this tactical basis. 
In Chapter 6 I discussed the religious reasons of opposition and here I 
found that reasons to oppose were that with the DOP Palestine, the holy land of 
the Muslims of all generations, was divided and part of it was given to the infidel 
Israelis. An acceptance of this would mean a betrayal of Islam and an 
abandonment of the Charter. The DOP did not make provisions for the 
establishment of an Islamic state and it contradicted the historical law of the final 
battle between Muslims and Jews, something which according to Hamas is what 
will lead to permanent peace.   
 
7.1. The Most Important Reason of Resistance. 
What were the most important reasons for Hamas’s opposition to Oslo then?  
As mentioned in the previous chapter Cleveland (1999:492) argues that Hamas’s 
opposition to the agreement was grounded in the Hamas Charter. With its 
definition of Palestine as a waqf it became impossible for the movement to accept 
the DOP. For Cleveland then, the religious argumentation seems to be the most 
important. Nüsse on the other hand, believes that the main argumentation against 
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the Oslo agreement was political and that this is due to that Hamas responded to 
the agreement in the same terms as it was written, namely political terms. Here we 
can recognize two types of argumentation, an ideological and religious one versus 
a more concrete one. On the one hand the objections are grounded in ideology and 
religion, which leave little room for compromises because the nature of the two 
very often is absolutistic. On the other hand, the resistance finds expression on a 
more concrete level. Here the objections are grounded in what I choose to call real 
life issues such as the issues discussed in Chapter 4 and 5; struggle for basic rights 
and sovereignty, as well as competition over power and adherents.  
I agree with Nüsse. I see the political resistance as more important than the 
religious one, because I believe that the conflict is fundamentally political; over 
territory, resources and rights of sovereignty. However, because the national-
political division lines of the conflict correspond with the religious division lines, 
both sides use religion to bolster and strengthen their arguments for what they 
perceive as their land. And both use religion to claim legitimacy and control in the 
way that they base their claims on the religious significance of events and places 
within the same territory. This does not mean that I question that the religious 
argumentation of Hamas is based on genuine faith and beliefs. I do not believe that 
religion is used purely as a pretext to sell a political point of view, but because I 
see the conflict as political in origin, I believe the political arguments to be more 
important. Even if the religious arguments have value of their own, I see them as 
more relevant to explain the resistance when used together with political 
arguments with the purpose of enhancing the latter’s significance. In the thesis I 
have stated that I believe the religious arguments to be more absolute and less 
subject to change than political ones. One of the religious arguments was that 
Hamas believes that Palestine belongs to the Muslims because they are Muslims. 
The DOP gave some of the area to the Jews, and impeded the restoration of an 
Islamic state in mandatory Palestine. Thus Hamas resisted the DOP. I do not 
question that for Hamas this is an important religious reason to object to the 
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agreement. However, in spite of this religious argument’s absolutistic nature I still 
do not find it as important as the political arguments because I believe it is used to 
reinforce a claim of territory, something which I see as a political claim. Although 
Hamas states in its Charter that Islam guides all the movement’s actions and 
beliefs, I do not believe that a purely religious perspective governs Hamas’s view 
of the Oslo accords. That the conflict is fundamentally political goes for Hamas 
too, but as religion has gained significance the conflict has taken on a religious 
aspect and in Hamas’s case an Islamization of the conflict has taken place. This is 
evident in that Hamas stresses the importance of restoring Islamic values to 
society as a solution to the conflict, as opposed to Jewish and secular values, and it 
corresponds with Hamas perception of the conflict as one between rival religions; 
Islam and Judaism. Also adding to why I do not find religion to constitute the most 
important reason of opposition is that Hamas proved itself to be very ideologically 
flexible when it could be favorable for the movement to sidestep its religious 
dogma as expressed in the canonical text and its leaflets.  
When it comes to what I chose to call the tactical reasons of opposition I 
see these as more important than the religious ones. The agreement was believed 
to be a threat to the very existence of Hamas, because Hamas to a large extent is 
founded on the struggle against Israel. Hamas is far less popular in times of 
relative peace than in years of much violence, such as the years of the first 
intifada. This adds weight to Mishal’s and Sela’s assumption that Hamas 
depended on the continuation of the intifada for its popular support. It does not, 
however, strengthen the assumption that Hamas would completely cease to exist 
without it. As seen in the thesis Hamas proved to be very flexible and 
pragmatically oriented. It skilfully manoeuvred its way through different kinds of 
problems and challenges. It was important to resist on a tactical basis because the 
DOP did pose a danger of marginalizing Hamas politically and militarily by 
putting restrictions on military activities. The real danger of Oslo in this regard 
however, was Hamas’s subordination to the PNA, especially that the PNA was 
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given power to deal with Hamas’s infrastructure which to a large extent is the 
civilian wing of the movement. It constituted a great risk to Hamas because if the 
civilian wing was punished then Hamas faced losing its base of popular support 
because the movement receives much of its support from the activities associated 
with this wing.  
Thus the tactical reasons of opposition were based on genuine fears, but the 
agreement did not in my opinion threaten Hamas’s raison d’être. As to whether 
Hamas was able to survive without the intifada, in retrospect, we will have to say 
that it has. Hamas survived even when the intifada ended. However, if one sees 
the intifada as a kind of jihad, because it was part of the general fight against 
Israel, then it cannot be said to have ended, because the jihad did not end with the 
signing of the agreement. As seen, after the Temple Mount Massacre of 1990 and 
particularly after the deportation of 1992, jihad took on a more violent form and to 
a large degree became equated with military or armed struggle. This fight is still 
going on with occasional breaks. Thus if Hamas will survive, and what role it then 
can assume in a state of real peace, remains to be seen.  
I find the political reasons of opposition to carry the most weight. The most 
important reason to object was that the agreement was perceived as very unjust for 
the Palestinians. While the religious and tactical arguments of resistance for the 
main part were particular of Hamas the political objections were shared by many 
groups opposed to Oslo, something which highlights the importance of these 
objections. The agreement’s major shortcoming was that it did not address the 
Palestinian’s basic claims, although some of these were postponed to be dealt with 
on a later stage. In addition it was so vaguely formulated that many issues would 
have to be renegotiated, and given the asymmetric relationship of power between 
the PLO and Israel, Palestinian critics believed Israel would be the beneficiaries of 
these renegotiations.  
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7.2. Relevance and Lesson Learned. 
In identifying the reasons behind Hamas’s opposition to Oslo I point to various 
weaknesses of the agreement, weaknesses that resulted in the DOP being rejected 
and opposed to by many parts of the Palestinian society. My thesis also points to 
part of the reason why the agreement now lies dead. Since my thesis deals with the 
political, tactical and religious reasons, something quite specific, I will not argue 
that these per se can be generalized to other studies. It is difficult to generalize 
from my findings, because they are very pertinent to Hamas but one lesson can be 
learned which may have validity outside the realms of Hamas and Palestine: there 
are great risks involved in ignoring in a peace process a group the size of Hamas 
which enjoys support from so many people. Hamas is a very important actor in the 
Israel-Palestinian conflict and I find it unrealistic to believe that a peace agreement 
followed by a durable peace can be achieved when it not only excludes such a 
group but also contradicts the ideas and beliefs of a movement with the amount of 
support that Hamas enjoys. Considerations should be paid to such strong actors, 
because they have both the power and the will to either uphold or destroy what 
they perceived as an unfair deal. A peace process should be as inclusive as 
possible. This is very difficult because in order to achieve a peace agreement one 
must make concessions and waive claims and as seen in the thesis Hamas states 
that it does not want a peace agreement at all and it holds very uncompromising 
stands on many issues. 
 
7.3. Outlook. 
Since the outbreak of the second intifada, the al-Aqsa intifada, in September of 
2000, Hamas became more militarily and politically active. It was denounced as a 
terrorist organization by the US in 1997 (U.S. Department of State, 2003) and by 
the European Union in 2003 (Frey, 2005).  During the intifada many notable 
Hamas members have been killed, including leaders such as Ismail Abu Shanab, 
Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, who was released from prison in 1997 and Abdul Aziz al-
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Rantisi. They were assassinated by Israel respectively in August of 2003 and 
March and April of 2004 and the movement’s popularity increased after these 
killings. Others such as Khaled Meshaal and Musa Abu Marzuq have fled to Iran 
and Syria. The former in addition to Mahmoud al-Zahar and Ismail Haniyya now 
serve as the movement’s top leaders.  
Following Yasser Arafat’s death in November 2004 Mahmoud Abbas was 
selected chairman of the PLO and elected president of the PNA in January of 
2005. In March he got Hamas to agree to a temporary cease fire with Israel. It is 
however a very fragile truce, which has been shaken many times, especially during 
the fall of 2005. I do not believe the Oslo agreement posed as big a threat to the 
movement as it first was believed to do. Now we know that the movement has 
survived, both as a military, civilian and political organization. If the parties reach 
a state of real peace, then maybe the movement will have to fall back on 
missionary, social and non-violent political work as the military wing will 
probably be redundant because Hamas’s call for an elimination of Israel will be 
less attractive to the Palestinians. However, given the current situation with daily 
attacks between Israel and Hamas I do not find it likely that a sustainable peace 
will emerge any time soon and in a state of continuous conflict Hamas is strong 
enough to challenge the PLO for leadership. This can be said to have happened to 
some extent already as the movement participated and did well in municipal and 
local elections of May and September 2005. As to whether the movement will 
participate in the parliamentary elections scheduled for January 2006 remains to 
be seen, as the movement at the time of writing has not yet decided it stance in this 
matter and it has not been decided if Hamas will be permitted to participate. Not 
permitting Hamas to participate could undermine the legitimacy of the electoral 
process because it would mean suppressing the voices of the movement’s many 
supporters. At the same time if Hamas decides and is permitted to join that would 
mean the movement would have to abandon some of its most uncompromising 
ideas. In order to survive as a political party and be a part of a democratic system 
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it would have to abandon its call for jihad. This might seem unlikely to happen, 
but here I find it appropriate to draw a comparison to the PLO and Fatah. These 
organizations embraced the Oslo process, abandoned their armed struggle and 
accepted Israel’s right to exist in spite of the PLO Charter (1968: article 9, 22), the 
PLO Constitution (1968: article 3) and the Fatah Constitution (1964: article 12) 
aiming for an elimination of Israel. Thus I find it difficult to discount for all future 
the possibility of Hamas moderating its views and abandoning its stipulations of a 
total eradication of the enemy state. Another sign of flexibility is that Hamas used 
the UN resolutions, which in the movement’s eyes were illegal, to argue against 
the DOP, something which implies an acceptance of the resolutions. Thus, this 
together with Hamas’s offer of a hudna may be regarded as a move from absolute 
rejection to a de facto recognition of Israel. Participation in the electoral process 
then could constitute an important step in reducing violence in the area something 
which may have the positive consequences of leading the peace process forward.  
Even if the military wing ceases to exist I believe Hamas will be able to 
survive as an Islamic organization because of its political program and not least 
because of the extensive social provisions which attracts supporters, offered by the 
civilian wing. I believe Hamas will continue to spread its message through its 
social institutions and welfare organizations, as well as through the municipalities 
and the unions. 
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